Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings by Noferi, Mark
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 
Volume 18
2012 
Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed 
Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal 
Proceedings 
Mark Noferi 
Brooklyn Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, 
Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily 
Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol18/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CASCADING CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATION:




Today, an immigrant green card holder mandatorily detained pending his removal
proceedings, without bail and without counsel, due to a minor crime committed
perhaps long ago, faces a dire fate. If he contests his case, he may remain
incarcerated in substandard conditions for months or years. While incarcerated, he
will likely be unable to acquire a lawyer, access family who might assist him, obtain
key evidence, or contact witnesses. In these circumstances, he will nearly inevitably
lose his deportation case and be banished abroad from work, family, and fiends.
The immigrant's one chance to escape these cascading events is the off-the-record
Joseph hearing challenging detention. If he wins the hearing and is released, he can
then secure counsel, and if so, will likely win his case. Yet detained and most likely
pro se, he may not even know a Joseph hearing exists, let alone win it, given the
complex statutory analysis involved, regarding facts, witnesses, and evidence outside
his reach.
The immigration detention system today is unique in modern American law, in
providing for preventive pretrial detention without counsel pursuant to underlying
proceedings without counsel-let alone proceedings so complex that result in a
deprivation of liberty as severe as deportation. In this Article, I call this the
cascading constitutional deprivation of wrongful detention and deportation. I argue,
under modern procedural due process theories, that this cascading constitutional
deprivation warrants appointed counsel, notwithstanding traditional plenary power
over immigration laws. In a post-Padilla v. Kentucky world where criminal
defenders must now advise their clients on the same issues litigated at the Joseph
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hearing, I argue a right to appointed counsel for mandatorily detained immigrants
pending removal proceedings is constitutionally viable and practically feasible.
INTRODUCTION....................................... 65
1. MANDATORY DETENTION PENDING REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS: AN OVERVIEW ..................... 74
A. Mandatory Detention's Deprivation of Liberty
and Impact on Lack of Representation ................. 76
1. Lack of Representation, Access to
Representation, or Legal Information ................ 76
2. Length of Confinement Due to
Court Backlogs........................... 80
B. Procedures for Determining and Challenging
Mandatory Detention............................ 82
1. The Mandatory Detention Determination ............ 83
2. TheJoseph Hearing and Bond Determinations....... 85
3. Removal Hearing .................... 88
C. Types of Legal Challenges to Mandatory
Detention at the Joseph Hearing.................... 89
1. Beyond Categorical Analysis: Challenges
to Immigration Classifications of
Criminal Convictions ...................... 89
2. Challenges to Immigration Impact of
Non-Conviction Criminal Dispositions ................ 94
3. Establishing Citizenship ..................... 95
11. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION APPLIED
TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND DEPORTATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW DESPITE PLENARY
POWER DOCTRINE ................................ 96
A. Lawful Permanent Residents' (LPRs') Recognized
Liberty Interests............................ 98
B. Immigration Detention's Impact on Liberty Interests............. 98
III. THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL AT A JOSEPH
HEARING UNDER THE MATHEWS V ELDRIDGE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS TEST ......................... 100
A. Private Interest at Stake:The "Cascading
Constitutional Deprivation" ........ ............. 101
1. Immigration Detention as a Deprivation
of Liberty ....................... ........... 101
2. Impact of Detention on Fundamental Fairness
of Underlying Removal Proceedings .................. 105
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation at the Joseph Hearing.........108
1. Complexity of Litigating
Immigration Proceedings ..................... 109
2. Adversarial Proceedings Against
Government Counsel ........................ 112
64 [VOL. 18:63
Cascading Constitutional Deprivation
3. Detained Immigrants as a
Vulnerable Population ..................... 113
4. Particular Procedural Deficiencies of]oseph
Hearings and Review ..................... 114
C. Government's Interests...........................115
1. Purported Informality Despite
Increasing Formality ............. .......... 116
2. The Impact of Counsel on Costs, Efficiency,
and Reduced Detention .......... .......... 118
3. Fairness and Transparency of Proceedings ........... 119
IV. PROVIDING THE RIGHT: PROPOSED CHANGES
AND EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES ................................. 121
A. Appointed Counsel for Mandatory Detainees at a
Prompt Joseph Hearing With Adequate Notice ................. 121
B. Policy Impacts: ho Represents Detained Immigrants
For How Long? ....................... ........ 122
1. "Unbundled" Representation at the
Joseph Hearing: Constitutionality,
Ethics, and Practicality ................ ..... 122
2. The Composition of the Immigrant
Detention Defender Corps .................. 124
3. Non-Lawyer Representation
(Accredited Representatives) ........ .......... 125
C. Evaluating Alternative Procedural Safeguards ....... ..... 126
CONCLUSION ........................................ 127
INTRODUCTION
Immigration detention, or "immcarceration,"' will ensnare nearly
429,000 immigrants this year. Some never should have been detained in
the first place, as the decision to detain was wrong. This is particularly
likely when a Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") officer decides
to mandatorily detain, without bail and without counsel, an immigrant
green card holder pending his removal proceedings, due to a nuinor crime
committed perhaps long ago. The DHS officer is not a lawyer, but will
have to engage in complex statutory and factual analysis of the immigra-
tion impact of a prior crime.
1. Anil Kathan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 CoLum. L. R-Ev. SIDEBAR 42,
43 (2010).
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011 4-5 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/irnniigration-statistics/enforcement ar.201 1.pdf.
3. See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Cate-
gorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.YU. L. REV. 1669, 1683-84 (2011) (describing
administrative process of mandatory detention determination). See generally Stephen H.
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To make matters worse, the mandatorily detained green card hold-
er-in legal parlance, a lawful permanent resident ("LPR")-may never
have a chance to meaningfully challenge that determination with counsel.
He may be detained in substandard conditions for months or years-often
far more time than he served for the crime-due to massive immigration
court backlogs and the absence of speedy trial protections. Worse, his
detention without counsel will deny him a fair chance to challenge his
deportation from family, work, and property in the United States-"all
that makes life worth living."' Once detained, and perhaps transferred to
faraway facilities, he will be unable to secure counsel who might assist
him, contact family members who might assist in counsel's stead, or access
documents or witnesses in any event. The impact of detention and conse-
quent lack of representation is stark. A recent New York study found that
a stunning 97 percent of detained and non-represented immigrants were
unsuccessful in their removal proceedings, while 74 percent of non-
detained and represented immigrants successfully stayed in America.
Legomsky, The Detention ofAliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv. 531, 533-34 (1999).
I use the term "mandatorily detained immigrant" here rather than the technically
accurate (but pejorative) "alien" or factually accurate (but less descriptive) "noncitizen." Cf
Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Lit(gation and Adminis-
trative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1647, 1648 n.2 (1997).
Additionally, in 1996, the term "deportation" was formally changed to the term
"removal." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). That said,
the removal of an immigrant whom has entered the United States (such as the mandatori-
ly detained lawful permanent residents described here) is historically and colloquially
known as "deportation" (as opposed to the "exclusion" of an arriving alien). Accordingly,
the terms "removal" and "deportation" will be used interchangeably here, except where
the distinction matters as noted.
Also, as 91 percent of immigration detainees were male as of 2009, 1 will default to
using "he" in this Article. See DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMI-
GRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONs, 6 (2009).
4. See LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIME-
LINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 12-17, 22-31 (2012), available at
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Enhancing-Quality-
and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf (describing
imnuigration court backlogs); see also INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS (2010)
[hereinafter IACHR], available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/
Migrants201.pdf (criticizing substandard conditions of immigration detention as violat-
ing international human rights standards); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA,JAILED WITHOUT
JUSTICE-IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA (2009) [hereinafter JAILED WITHOUT JUS-
TICE], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (similarly
criticizing detention conditions).
5. Ng Fung Ho v.White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
6. New York Immigrant Representation Study, Accessing justice: The Availability and
Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 33 CARDozo L. REV. 357, 363-64 (2011)
[hereinafter NYIRS].
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The mandatorily detained immigrant's one chance, legally and prac-
tically, to change this course of events lies at a Joseph hearing. In a Joseph
hearing, held before an immigration judge, he can challenge the DHS
officer's basis for his mandatory detention and deportability, gain eligibil-
ity for bail, and, if released, have an opportunity to secure counsel and
likely win his case.7 Yet the Joseph hearing process, as structured today, is
unlikely to prevent a wrongful detention and deportation." At the outset,
the detained immigrant must know to ask for ajoseph hearing, since DHS
currently misinforms him that no available hearing exists.9 If he receives
one, to win, he must argue pro se against trained government counsel
without access to key documents, witnesses, or law books. He must grap-
ple with federal immigration law issues so legally and factually
complicated that Justice Alito called it "unrealistic" for criminal defense
lawyers to advise on them, 0 let alone pro se detained immigrants to liti-
gate them. And if he loses the Joseph hearing, he must argue the same
issues again at his deportation hearing, with the same constraints, and usu-
ally the same result." No wonder a recent conference on immigration
detention was entitled "imprisoned, forgotten, and deported." 2 Approxi-
mately over 8,000 mandatorily detained green card holders may attempt
to navigate this process this year.'
7. See id.; see alsoJoseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999).
8. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461,
1474 (2011) (calling "wrongful deportations (that is, deportations based on mistakes of fact
or law) ... among the most shameful legal phenomena of our time"); Legonsky, supra
note 3, at 542. Wrongful detention, I argue, exacerbates this phenomenon.
9. See infra note 119.
10. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010) (AlitoJ., concurring).
11. A detainee who wins hisjoseph hearing will likely win his underlying deporta-
tion case because the legal issues are in most instances the same. See infra Section I.C.
12. See Loyola University, New Orleans, Inprisoned, Forgotten, and Deported: Iminigra-
tion Detention, Advocacy, and the Faith Community, CENTER FOR LATIN AMERICAN STuDIEs,
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, http://www.latam.ufl.edu/News/events.stm (last visited Oct. 1,
2012).
13. These estimations derive from a recent report finding that 9 percent of New
Yorkers that ICE arrests and detains are mandatorily detained pre-removal hearing, and
that 21.2 percent of New York-area detainees are LPRs. NYU ScHOOL OF LAW IMMi-
GRANT RIGHTS CLINIC ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA
ON IMMIGRANT DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY 7, 10 (2012),
[hereinafter INSECURE COMMUNITIES], available at http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012-FINAL.pdf. Extrapolating the
NewYork-area statistics onto national data, I estimate that ICE mandatorily detains 38,610
each year, 8,185 (21.2 percent) of those being LPRs.
Estimation is necessary because ICE does not publicly release information on its
numbers of mandatory pre-hearing detainees or LPRs; it may not even track these numbers.
DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING Li, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION DETEN-
TION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES?
25-31 (2009) available at
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In this Article, I argue that current constitutional due process doctrine
dictates the appointment of counsel to mandatorily detained LPRs to chal-
lenge detention at their Joseph hearings. The argument centers on what I
call the "cascading constitutional deprivation" of pretrial immigration de-
tention without counsel. This cascading deprivation, although potentially
cognizable elsewhere, goes beyond the traditionally-recognized loss of liber-
ty from detention and includes detention's resultant impact on the
fundamental fairness of the underlying proceeding."
This cascading deprivation is strongest in immigration removal pro-
ceedings. Procedurally, immigration removal proceedings uniquely
provide for preventive pretrial detention without counsel pursuant to un-
derlying proceedings without counsel. Substantively, the underlying
deportation proceedings result in harsh deprivation themselves. Indeed,
outside of criminal law, as Nora Demleitner put it, "[o]nly deportation" is
likely to rise to the same level of deprivation of liberty as detention. 5
Moreover, if counsel is to be provided in removal proceedings, the argu-
ments for it are strongest at the Joseph hearing challenging detention.
Access to counsel at that point could both avoid the most constitutional
harm to the detainee and provide the most efficiency benefits to the Gov-
16
ernment.
These arguments for appointed counsel to mandatory pre-hearing
LPR immigration detainees build on suggestions by David Cole and oth-
ers.17 These arguments also holistically draw on prior arguments relating
to the individual components of mandatory detention and deportation.
These include recent arguments by scholars examining appointed counsel
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1OO9.pdf (recommending that
ICE detention data systems track mandatory detainees under different statutory authorities,
as well as LPR status and potential citizenship).
14. See Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN.J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 117 (2008) (noting two "distinct, but com-
plementary arguments" for appointed counsel for immigration detainees).
15. Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Com-
mitment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1668 n.332 (2003) (citing
Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Law and the Limited Scope
of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1938-43 (2000)); see Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at
1481, 1484 n.11 (deportation is a particularly severe "penalty" akin to "banishment or
exile") (citations omitted). See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Diferent, 13 U.
PA.J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011).
16. See infra Section III.C.2.
17. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and
War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 719 (2009) (arguing that statute modeled on federal Bail Re-
form Act should govern preventive immigration detention); Faiza W Sayed, Note,
Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than "Enemy Combatants"
and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1874 (2011) (suggesting that man-
datorily detained aliens who request a joseph hearing should be provided counsel).
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and immigration detention generally,'8 which have emerged since the de-
velopment in the late 1980s and 1990s of mandatory immigration
detention statutes like the one discussed here.' These also include argu-
ments in other preventive detention contexts,20 including criminal pretrial
bail hearings;21 arguments in civil proceedings where liberty is at stake,
18. Kaufman, supra note 14 (examining impact of detention on right-to-counsel
arguments); see also LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring Competent Representa-
tion in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 123, 154-55 (2009) (arguing for appointed
counsel for detained immigrants under "quasi-criminal" analysis). Media and advocacy
organizations have also recently argued for appointed counsel to immigration detainees.
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING OUR IMMIGRATION
DETENTION SYSTEM AND PROMOTING ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS, 8
(2009) (calling for appointed counsel as an "aspirational goal"); Editorial, Immigrant detain-
ees deserve lawyers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.latimes.coim/news/opinion/
opinionla/la-ed-counsel-20111108,0,2305323.story; New York City Bar, Report on the
Right to Counsel for Detained Individuals in Removal Proceedings (Nov. 2, 2009),
http://www2.nycbar.org/citybajusticecenter/news-a-media/press-releases/127-nyc-bar-
association-calls-for-right-to-counsel-for-immigrant-detainees.
19. The explosion in detention is commonly traced to multiple laws during this
time period drastically broadening the use of mandatory detention without eligibility for
bond. See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 601, 609-13 (2010). In 1988, Congress enacted mandatory pre-
hearing detention without bond for those noncitizens convicted of an "aggravated felony."
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The Act defined "ag-
gravated felony" to include murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking, which
further triggered mandatory detention. Id. %§ 7342, 7343(a)(4). In 1996, the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provided for mandatory detention for immi-
grants convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substances
offenses, firearms offenses, and certain national security-related offenses. 8 U.S.C.
5 1226(c)(1) (2006); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (1996). The same year, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" to
encompass again more types of crimes and subjected other categories of immigrants with
convictions to mandatory pre-hearing detention. Illegal Immigration Reform and Inuni-
grant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-627 (1996). Congress
then codified these provisions at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Increased post- 9 / 1 1 immigration
enforcement of these laws has also increased detention. Kalhan, supra note 1, at 42, 44.
Before these laws, the old Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), similar
to the criminal system, had historically released someone pending a deportation hearing
on recognizance, or set bond, which the immigrant could then ask an immigration judge
to lower. See Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills: Detention and Imnqration, 5 INTERCUL-
TURAL HUM. RTS. L. REv. 11, 39-40 (2010).
20. See Cole, supra note 17; Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in
American Theory and Practice, 2 HAv. NAT'L SEC. J. 85, 145-52, 189 (2011) (describing a
trend of U.S. preventive detention statutes towards "developing more rigorous due process
protections to guarantee that [the law] does not authorize more detention than is truly
necessary").
21. Douglas L. Colbert, 77hirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at
Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1998) (arguing for constitutional right to
counsel at bail hearing).
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and arguments for counsel in immigration deportation proceedings (leav-
23
ing aside the impact of detention).
The analysis in this Article follows the familiar three-part procedural
due process framework of Mathews v. Eldridge, which balances (1) the indi-
vidual's private interest at stake, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the interest (as well as the probable value of additional or different proce-
dural safeguards), and (3) the government's interest in using current, rather
24than additional or different, procedures. I briefly set out here overarch-
ing doctrinal concerns, before proceeding with analysis in the bulk of the
Article.
First, I argue to provide a subclass of noncitizens, mandatory pre-
hearing LPR imn-igration detainees, a constitutional right that U.S.
citizen criminal defendants lack: the right to appointed counsel at the
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (mandating appointed counsel for juvenile com-
mitment hearings); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (requiring appointed counsel or
social worker for psychiatric commitment hearing); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507,
2517-20 (2011) (requiring alternative procedural safeguards to counsel for civil contem-
nors).
23. Currently, there exists only a case-by-case right to appointed counsel in depor-
tation proceedings. See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 E2d 565, 568 (6th Cit. 1975).
That said, academics have intermittently argued for the right. See Donald Kerwin, Revisit-
ing the Need for Appointed Counsel, 4 MPI INSIGHT 1 (2005); David A. Robertson, An
Opportunity to Be Heard: The Right to Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV.
1019, 1040 (1988); Mark T. Fennell, Note, Preserving Process in the Wake of Policy: The Need
for Appointed Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 23 ND J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y
261 (2009); Beth J.Werlin, Note, Renewing the Call: Imnigrants' Right to Appointed Counsel
in Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000); see also Robert S. Catz &
Nancy Lee Frank, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv 397 (1984); Charles Gordon,
Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1961); William Haney,
Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARv. INT'L L.J. 177 (1970).
24. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
This Article will assume that Mathews analysis applies to deportation proceedings
and the detention hearing pursuant to them, as it would to any civil case, because courts
today are most likely to apply that test. That said, Daniel Kanstroom and Peter Markowitz
recently argued, after Padilla v. Kentucky's holding that deportation is "uniquely difficult to
classify" as a direct or collateral consequence of a criminal conviction, that a stricter con-
stitutional test than Mathews balancing should govern deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). For example, Kanstroom argued that deportation proceedings
should conform to a stricter test that approaches the criminal system's low tolerance for
error. Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1475. Peter Markowitz similarly argued for a "hard floor"
framework, with rights provided to all regardless of cost, at least for some deportation
proceedings (perhaps those involving detention). Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1307, 1352-
53, 1357-60 (characterizing Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel as a "hard
floor," and raising question of whether detainees warrant a similar "hard floor" right).
These arguments will be the subject of future research.
70 [VOL. 18:63
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hearing challenging their pretrial detention.2 5 However, the discrepancy is
of more expressive validity than doctrinal.26
My arguments here build upon scholars' arguments first made in the
middle of the twentieth century that criminal pretrial detention has a
similar cascading impact on trial rights that warrants appointed counsel.27
Those arguments were largely mooted by two developments: (1) Gideon v.
Wainwright, which in 1963 constitutionally provided criminal defendants
appointed counsel at trial,28 and its progeny expanding that right to all
critical stages;29 and (2) the subsequent, and increasingly frequent, statuto-
ry provision of counsel at criminal bail hearings, which rendered
constitutional arguments unnecessary in those jurisdictions.30 Functionally,
a criminal defendant facing jail time today in most jurisdictions will re-
ceive counsel at some point, usually earlier rather than later.
Such is not the case in immigration proceedings, where a pretrial
detainee will never receive counsel. The risk and severity of the cascading
constitutional deprivation is worse. In essence, I argue to harmonize Fifth
Amendment due process applied to mandatory detention hearings with
academics' initial, pre-Gideon conception of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments applied to criminal pretrial proceedings. Although some arguments
here would support a yet-to-be-found parallel constitutional right at a
bail hearing," nothing requires Fifth Amendment due process rights to
follow Sixth Amendment rights in lockstep.32
25. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 235 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (Court has not found a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a criminal bail
hearing).
26. See infra Section III.C.
27. See infra Section IlIl.A.
28. 372 U.S. 335,342-45 (1963).
29. The Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel attaches once adversary judi-
cial proceedings have been initiated against the defendant, and applies at any critical stage
before trial. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-89 (1984). See generally Kan-
stroom, supra note 8, at 1470 n.46.
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006) (federal system provides counsel at bail hearing);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44; Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 Bur. L. REV.
333, 341-42, 386, 389 (2011) (summarizing states and localities that statutorily provide
counsel at a bail hearing). Similarly, the trend in other preventive detention systems is to
statutorily provide counsel. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d) (2006) (covering appointed counsel in
federal sexually violent predator commitment hearings); NATIONAL DEFENSR AUTHORIZA-
TION ACT FOR FISCALYEAR 2012, H.R. REP. No. 112-329, at 269-270 (2012) (Conf. Rep.),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt329/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt329-
ptl.pdf (providing military appointed counsel in military hearings to, inter alia, those who
"substantially supported" Al Qaeda). See generally Klein & Wittes, supra note 20.
31. Colbert, supra note 30, at 341-42 (noting that Rothgery supports right to counsel
at a bail hearing).
32. Indeed, Fifth Amendment due process rights arguably encompass a broader
range of circumstances than Sixth Amendment rights. Sixth Amendment rights, although
more established, traditionally only protect the defendant's interest at trial and not pretrial
deprivation of liberty per se (although that assumption is increasingly in question). See
FALL 2012] 71
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Moreover, other factors specific to immigration proceedings exacer-
bate the risk of wrongful detention and deportation without counsel. The
complexity of immigration proceedings (particularly mandatory detention
hearings), the asymmetry of trained government counsel on the other
side, and the particular vulnerabilities of a detained foreign population all
make it difficult for a pro se detainee to be meaningfully heard.
Further, the government has recently exacerbated this complexity
by incorporating increasingly formal, trial-type evidentiary inquiries to
raise its own lawyers' chances of detaining and deporting immigrants.Jo-
seph hearings (and deportation hearings) now go beyond "categorical
analysis" of the record of conviction and turn upon "any additional evi-
dence or factfinding" the immigration court deems necessary." The law-
lawyers' advocacy skills that Gideon identified are correspondingly even
more crucial.
Moreover, this voluntary complexity belies any government argu-
ments based on the efficiency or cost savings that "informal" adjudication
procedures provide.3 1 Indeed, if the government can now provide ap-
pointed counsel in wartime detention proceedings, it can provide
appointed counsel in peacetime immigration proceedings.3 ' The costs of
appointed counsel would likely be de minimis compared to the costs of
detention, and the provision of counsel early in the case might well fur-
ther efficiency by resolving cases more quickly, reducing detention, and
reducing court backlogs. The government also possesses a non-
quantifiable interest in providing counsel-namely, ensuring the public
legitimacy of its system of detaining lawful residents with significant
' 36
community ties.
Most likely, the strongest argument against appointed counsel is not
that Mathews balancing disfavors it, but rather, that procedural due process
plays little if any role at all. Plenary power doctrine provides that Congress
and the executive branch have broad, and often exclusive, authority to
regulate immigration matters incidental to national sovereignty. Courts
supra note 29; infra Section III.A.1 & note 289. Conversely, Fifth Amendment due process,
with a touchstone of "fundamental fairness," is famously flexible and adaptable to new
facts and circumstances.Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REv 1309, 1311
(2011).
33. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (A.G. 2008), rejected by Prudencio v.
Holder 699 F3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012).
34. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Das, supra note 3, at 1730-32; see
infra Section Ill.C.1.
35. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, H.R. REP. No.
112-329, at 269-270 (2012) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-1 12hrpt329/pdf/CRPT-1 12hrpt329-ptl.pdf.
36. Cf Juliet Stumpf, Fittin2 Punishuent, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1683, 1731 (2009)
(arguing that immigration law sanctions scheme should reflect benefit to United States of




exercise deferential constitutional review.17 However, courts have carved
out procedural due process exceptions to plenary power as they applied
the modern procedural due process revolution to immigration law." In
doing so, courts have recognized two principles relevant here: (1) that
LPRs have cognizable liberty interests, owing to their years of residency,
work, and family ties in America;39 and (2) when their liberty interests are
deprived by detention, procedural due process imposes constitutional
constraints.4 0
Thus, I accept for this Article the holding of Demore v. Kim, which,
citing plenary power principles, upheld as a matter of substantive due pro-
cess the mandatory pre-hearing immigration detention without bail
discussed here." Here, I argue that procedural due process dictates appoint-
ed counsel so the mandatory detainee may meaningfully defend himself at
42
the Joseph hearing, which Demore explicitly did not address.
This Article has four Parts. Part I provides an overview of the practi-
cal inability of an immigrant mandatorily detained pre-hearing to
challenge his detention and deportation. Part II articulates the doctrinal
arguments for procedural due process-derived exceptions to plenary im-
migration power. Part III argues that under Mathews v. Eldridge, procedural
due process requires appointed counsel at a Joseph hearing. 3 Finally, Part
IV proposes procedures for appointed counsel, proposes an Immigrant
Detention Defender Corps, and rejects alternative procedural safeguards
to full representation. Theoretically, "unbundled" representation at the
Joseph hearing is possible, as the right to counsel articulated here turns on
the right to challenge detention. However, because other procedural in-
firmities currently result in continued detention of even those who win
Joseph hearings, the cascading impact of detention on their hearing rights
37. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83
Am. J. Ir'L L. 862,870 (1989).
38. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 CoLuM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).
39. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 543-47 (2003) (SouterJ., dissenting) (U.S. immi-
gration law "goes out of its way to encourage" economic, familial, and social ties for LPRs
"indistinguishable from those of a citizen," and thus, due process applies to LPRs) (citing
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (noting that LPRs possess liberty interests)).
40. Motonura, supra note 38, at 1655-56.
41. Demnore, 538 U.S. at 521 ("Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.") (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80
(1976)).
42. Demore did not analyze the procedural due process required at ajoseph hearing
because petitioner Kim never requested one. See Demote, 538 U.S. at 514 n.3 ("[W]e have
no occasion to review the adequacy ofJoseph hearings generally .... ") (citing Joseph, 22 1.
& N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999)); id. at 531 (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("[D]ue process requires
individualized procedures to ensure there is at least some merit to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service's (INS) charge and, therefore, sufficient justification to detain a
lawful permanent resident alien pending a more formal hearing.").
43. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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may make unbundled representation constitutionally infeasible in the cur-
rent system.
Finally, this Article attempts to shift the debate regarding appointed
counsel in immigration proceedings from the politically viable to the
constitutionally viable. Most recent scholarship (and some litigation) re-
garding appointed counsel in immigration proceedings has focused on
politically sympathetic immigrants: asylum seekers,4 4 the mentally disa-
bled," and juveniles. Although immigrants with criminal convictions are
politically stigmatized, pre-hearing mandatory detainees, I argue, cur-
rently possess the most substantively viable constitutional arguments for
appointed counsel of any sub-class of immigrants in proceedings.
I. MANDATORY DETENTION PENDING REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS:
AN OVERVIEW
This section will outline the landscape facing a mandatorily de-
tained iminigrant who seeks to challenge his detention pro se. It will
explore the practical constraints of detention without representation, the
immense court backlogs that impose a de facto incarcerative sentence on
those who contest deportation, the procedural infirmities of the mandato-
ry detention process, and the legal and factual complexities of the Joseph
challenge and ultimate deportation hearing. In sum, these procedures are
a recipe for wrongful detention and deportation.4 8
The wealth of recent empirical evidence compiled by governmental,
advocacy, and human rights organizations allows for a fuller constitutional
44. See John R. Mills, Kristen M. Echemendia & Stephen Yale-Loehr, "Death Is
Different" and a Refugee's Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 361, 363 (2009); Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295, 340 (2007).
45. See, e.g., Franco-Gonzalez v. Napolitano, No. 10-02211, 9-10, 17-18, 22 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (order certifying class of mentally disabled immigration detainees
seeking, inter alia, appointed counsel in their immigration proceedings); see also Alice
Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices, the Due-Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in
Removal Proceedings, 45 NEw ENG. L. REV. 373 (2011).
46. See, e.g., Devon A. Corneal, On the Way to Grandmother's House: Is US. Immigra-
tion Policy More Dangerous than the Big Bad Wolffor Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens?, 109 PENN
ST. L. REv. 609 (2004); Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Be Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right
to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C.THIRDWORLD L.J. 41 (2011); David B.
Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights Underlying Immi-
gration Law, 63 OHio ST. L.J. 979 (2002).
47. See Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1357 (noting that criminal aliens are a group
that "garners almost unrivaled political disfavor").
48. As Daniel Kanstroom notes, even a 1 percent error rate in deportations, "which
would be a rather positive accomplishment for" DHS, would equal 80,000 to 100,000




assessment of the impact of detention without counsel.'9 That said, the
empirical evidence only confirms our intuitions that detention creates
barriers to accessing counsel, and detention without counsel in turn im-




49. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 29-30 n.5 (1981) (considering
statistics regarding erroneous deprivation of counsel).
50. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 360-61.
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A. Mandatory Detention's Deprivation of Liberty
and Impact on Lack of Representation
1. Lack of Representation, Access to Representation,
or Legal Information
The recent study led by Second Circuit Judge Robert Katzmann
described an "immigrant representation crisis" in removal proceedings.'
The crisis particularly affects detainees. Put simply, most detainees are un-
able to secure adequate legal assistance.52 In 2009, nearly two-thirds of
detainees in removal proceedings were unrepresented.5 3 Even in New
York, where there are many in-ugration attorneys, 60 percent of detain-
ees lack counsel by the time their cases are completed (as compared to 27
percent of non-detained immigrants).5 4
Few lawyers have the resources to assist detainees because of the ad-
ditional communication time, the complexity of cases involving criminal
convictions, and the possibility of transfer forcing counsel to continue
representation in a far-flung representation.5 This is particularly true for
pro bono organizations, which must triage their limited resources. Un-
fortunately, many immigrant detainees are indigent, and for them, pro
bono counsel is their only choice. 7
ICE's pattern of transferring detainees from urban areas such as New
York or Los Angeles, near where immigrants live, to facilities in Louisiana,
Texas, or Arizona underserved by lawyers has exacerbated the representa-
tion crisis for detainees." Although transfers in the criminal system are
limited by the Sixth Amendment right to face trial in the jurisdiction
where a crime occurred, ICE has staunchly opposed any limits to its
51. Id. at 358.
52. Id. at 363 ("The greatest area of need for indigent removal defense is ... for
detained individuals.").
53. CONIsTmrnIoN PROJECT, supra note 18, at 2. In 2010, an ABA study spanning all
immigration proceedings found 84 percent of detainees unrepresented. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS,
EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-8 (2010),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission on_
imnigration/coi-complete-fullreport.authcheckdam.pdf.
54. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 372.
55. Id. at 387-88, 396-97, 400-01, 404 n.106. Accordingly, only 33 percent of de-
tainees with cases in NewYork had counsel, as compared to 79 percent of nondetainees.
56. Id. at 387-88.
57. Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Depor-
tation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FoRDHAM L. REV. 541, 548 (2009)
(surveying population of those in deportation proceedings and arguing that "many re-
spondents simply lack the financial resources to hire private counsel").
58. SCHRIRO, supra note 3, at 8.
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transfer power. 9 Transfers of detainees recently tripled between 2004 and
60 612009. In 2009, 52 percent of detainees were transferred at least once.
Multiple transfers are common as well. From 1998 to 2010, over 46 per-
cent of transferred detainees were moved at least twice, with 3,400
62detainees transferred ten times or more. Worse, detainees are most often
transferred to facilities nearest the least amount of lawyers, such as Louisi-
ana, with over 500 detainees for every immigration lawyer.
Unsurprisingly, transferred detainees are less likely to be successful at their
removal hearing.6 4
All in all, mandatory detainees with complex yet viable claims, yet
detained faraway from documents and evidence-those "most in need of
counsel to help them make their case"-are least able to secure it."
59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED Up FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 6 (2009).
On January 4, 2012, ICE released new policy guidance regarding detainee transfers.
An immigration officer is now required to obtain approval to transfer a detainee with
immediate family, an attorney of record, or pending proceedings nearby However, the
exceptions to the requirement are extremely broad; for example, exceptions include "re-
liev[ing] or prevent[ing] facility overcrowding," or "transfer to a more appropriate
detention facility based on the detainee's individual circumstances and risk factors." See
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, POLICY 11022.1: DETAINEE TRANSFERS
5 5.2(3) (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/hd-
detainee-transfers.pdf The policies may also encourage quick transfer before a detainee
secures an attorney. The impact of the guidance remains unclear. See C6sar Cuauht~moc
Garcia Hernindez, ICE's New Prisoner Transfer Policy: Something Old, Something New,
CRIMMIGRATION (May 15, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/ 2 0 1 2/05/15/ices-
new-prisoner-transfer-policy-something-old-something-new.aspx.
60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A COSTLY MOVE: FAR AND FREQUENT TRANSFERS IMPEDE
HEARINGS FOR IMMIGRANT DETAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2. The Fifth Circuit received 483,457 transfers from 1998-2010. Id. at 22.
The Ninth Circuit received the most transfers (760,606) and had the second-worst ratio
(284 to 1). Id. at 23. In 2010, 80 percent of detainees were in severely underserved facili-
ties, with more than one hundred detainees for every full-time NGO attorney NATIONAL
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED ACCESS To LEGAL COUNSEL
IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A FAIR DAY IN COURT 4 (2010) [here-
inafter ISOLATED IN DETENTION].
64. A national study found that 74 percent of transferred detainees ultimately were
deported, compared to 54 percent of detainees never transferred. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 60, at 22. A New York-area study found that 94.5 percent of those transferred
outside the New York and New Jersey area were deported. INSECURE COMMUNITIES, Supra
note 13, at 16. For these reasons, scholars have argued that transfer alone violates the due
process right to appointed counsel. C~sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernindez, Due Process and
Inmnigrant Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to
Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 17 (2011).
65. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 387. Even if a detainee could secure a lawyer, detention
imposes barriers to communication with that lawyer. In 2010, 78 percent of detainees
were in facilities that prohibited scheduling private telephone calls with lawyers. ISOLATED
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It is possible that a "selection effect" may exist regarding mandatory
detainees' lack of representation-i.e., mandatory detainees cannot find
lawyers because lawyers take "better" claims to conserve resources.6 6 In-
deed, many mandatory detainees are barred by law from seeking relief,
and if so, their only chance is to challenge the immigration classification
of their conviction. That said, the New York study concluded a "causal
effect" between representation and success was more likely rather than
vice versa. 6 A lawyer's actions such as collecting evidence and witnesses
contribute to the success of a claim.69 Those actions, as well as a lawyer's
legal and argumentative skills, are most central to a mandatory detainee's
claim, as set forth in Section III.B infra.
If a detainee cannot secure counsel, he may have few alternatives.
He may litigate his case pro se, forced to rely entirely on legal resources in
detention, such as law libraries. Unfortunately, some detention facilities do
not have law libraries. Where they exist, the materials are commonly out-
IN DETENTION, supra note 63, at 4. Several facilities prohibit contact visits where detainees
can exchange legal documents with counsel. IACHR, supra note 4,1 326.
66. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 386-87.
67. In addition to challenging removability, some mandatorily detained aliens are
eligible for certain forms of discretionary relief from removal. See generally Dana Leigh
Marks, A View Through the Looking Glass, 39 FoiuRtm URn. L.J. 91, 110 (2012). The most
pertinent forms of available relief are cancellation of removal, see 8 U.S.C. 5 1229b(a)
(2006), or persecution-based grounds, such as asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006), with-
holding of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), or withholding or deferral of removal
under the Convention against Torture, 8 C.ER. %§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2012). An "aggra-
vated felony" disqualifies one for relief, however. Marks, supra, at 100 n.49; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B) (aggravated felony disqualifies one for asylum).
Cancellation of removal applies to a LPR convicted of a crime other than an aggra-
vated felony if he has been a lawful permanent resident for five years, has resided
continuously in the United States for seven years after having been admitted in any status,
and can demonstrate that he is deserving of the favorable exercise of discretion. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a).A number of noncitizens also remain eligible for the more expansive predeces-
sor to "Cancellation of Removal," 212(c) relief, as a result of the Court's decision in INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that 1996 elimination of 212(c) does not apply ret-
roactively); see also Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)
(2006).Voluntary departure also is considered a form of relief, albeit typically not consid-
ered a successful outcome, in that the LPR must leave the United States. Marks, supra, at
111. Seegenerally Kaufman, supra note 14, at 119.
Generally, this Article will focus on challenges to removability, since those issues are
litigated at the Joseph hearing, and the constitutional impact of infringement on available
discretionary relief is less clear. See Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1508-09 ("[OJur under-
standing of discretion in deportation law is itself a complicated problem.") (citing Daniel
Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion and the "Rule" of Immigra-
tion Law, 51 N.YL. ScH. L. REv. 161 (2006)); Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in
the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REv. 703 (1997)).
68. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 387 (citing Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295,




dated, unrelated to immigration, and in English.70 And, even if law librar-
ies do exist, access to them is commonly limited as well, as requests for
access often depend on the "mood of the guards."" Translation services
are generally inadequate, especially considering that immigration deten-
tion by definition houses foreign nationals.72 ICE is not required to
73
provide legal materials in foreign languages. Alternatively, a detainee may
rely heavily on family for assistance, who might be his only source of
documents or evidence. Yet pro se detainees face significant barriers to
contact with the outside world.7 1 ICE's frequent transfers of detainees to
far-flung areas exacerbate detainees' isolation. Some facilities entirely
prohibit contact visits with family.76 Telephone access, often detainees'
primary access to the outside world, is generally limited as well.77
Some detention facilities, with pro bono help, have improved their
provision of legal information. In 2003, the Legal Orientation Program
(LOP) began, through which trained nonprofit representatives conduct
legal orientations, self-help workshops, or referrals for pro bono represen-
tation.7 EOIR currently oversees LOPs at twenty-five detention
70. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAw CTR., A BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS
REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S. IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS 33 (2009) [hereinafter NILC];
JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 32.
71. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 32.
72. Id. at 34. The new 2011 ICE detention standards provide generally for transla-
tion, although not in connection with litigating proceedings. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011 1
(2012) [hereinafter DETENTION STANDARDS], available at http://www.ice.gov/detention-
standards/2011/ (in several places, providing that "[a]ll written materials provided to
detainees shall generally be translated into Spanish," and "[w]here practicable, provisions
for written translation shall be made for other significant segments of the population"); see
also id. at 240 ("Facilities shall provide appropriate interpretation and language services for
[liinited English proficient] detainees related to medical and mental health care."); id. at
336 (requiring translation services in grievance process). It is unclear whether these goals
have been realized in practice.
73. The new ICE detention standards provide that limited-English detainees who
"indicate difficulty with the legal materials must be provided assistance beyond access to a
set of English-language law books." However, this assistance is only "to the extent practi-
cable" (e.g., "helping the detainee obtain assistance from other detainees," and assisting in
contacting pro bono organizations). DETENTION STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 346.
74. See Markowitz, supra note 57, at 559.
75. Id. at 556-58.
76. NILC, supra note 70, at 15 & n.23; see also IACHR, supra note 4, 327, 330.
77. Many centers have only two or three phones available for as many as forty to
fifty detainees. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 35. Several facilities inappropriately
required detainees to pay for calls to government offices, such as to obtain documents.
NILC, supra note 70, at 27.
78. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: EOIR's LEGAL ORIENTATION AND PRO
BoNo PROGRAM 1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/
LegalOrientProBonoFactSheet012710.pdf.
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facilities, 7 although over half of detention facilities still offer no "know-
your-rights" program."'
In any event, the substandard conditions of detention further exac-
erbate the difficulty of litigating pro se." The mental and physical anguish
of prolonged detention also can impact the ability to meaningfully liti-
82gate.
2. Length of Confinement Due to Court Backlogs
I address here the length of confinement that pre-hearing mandato-
ry detainees experience to make two points: first, that the deprivation of
liberty is severe enough to be constitutionally cognizable (at least, if de-
tainees contest their case), and relatedly, that the coercive effect of such
prolonged detention encourages detainees to forego claims.
First, deprivation of liberty has traditionally possessed a temporal
component under due process analysis. Detention for a year is a more
severe deprivation of liberty than detention for a day, or an hour, although
no bright-line exists. 3 Indeed, Demore v. Kim explicitly incorporated in its
ruling a finding that mandatory pre-hearing detainees were on average
only detained for limited times (a finding that has since been chal-
lenged) .8
ICE has not released statistics regarding the length of time that pre-
hearing mandatory detainees spend in detention.5 However, from what is
79. Id.
80. ISOLATED IN DETENTION, supra note 63, at 4.
81. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 129. Detention conditions have recently been report-
ed as unsanitary, abusive in response to assertion of rights, and reflecting high incidence of
death. See JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 42-43 (detainee, "after refusing to sign
his deportation order without first speaking with an attorney," was handcuffed, shackled,
and beaten by six officers forcefully slamming him against the wall and concrete floor);
IACHR, supra note 4, $T 297-307 (detailing unsanitary conditions such as overcrowding,
insufficient food and water, and infectious disease outbreaks); U.S. Immigration & Cus-
toms Enforcement, Detention Management Program, List of Deaths in ICE Custody October
2003-December 19, 2011, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/detaineedeaths2003-
present.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) (121 ICE detainees have died since October 2003).
82. RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, FREED BUT NOT
FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE CURRENT USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETEN-
TION 3 (2012), [hereinafter FREED BUT NOT FREE], available at http://www.
law.newark.rutgers.edu/files/FreedbutnotFree.pdf; see also Kaufman, supra note 14, at 142.
83. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (noting that contempt statute
provided for imprisonment for up to one year); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-701
(2001) (defining six months as presumptively reasonable for post-removal order detention);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (providing appointed counsel where at least
six months ofjail time at stake).
84. 538 U.S. 510, 529-31 (2003); see also infra notes 257, 259.
85. See KERWIN & Li, supra note 13 (ICE does not publicly release information on
mandatory pre-hearing detainees and may not track it).
80
Cascading Constitutional Deprivation
available, one can infer that a mandatorily detained immigrant today who
contests his case will commonly spend months, and sometimes over a
year, in detention because of enormous immigration court backlogs.86 The
average immigration case pending today has been pending for 529 days,
with the average case involving a criminal charge (and thus, more likely to
be a detainee's) pending for 455 days." While some detainees' cases re-
solve more quickly, it is likely because many detainees accept deportation
to escape detention, regardless of the merits. Regarding detainees with
prior criminal convictions who do contest, their cases may take longer
since they involve more complex analysis.90 Moreover, as ICE expands its
enforcement initiatives, and the use of detention increases, it is expected
that court backlogs will increase with it.9'
86. IACHR, supra note 4, 103. Of the 4,170 individuals in January 2009 who had
been detained for six months or longer, 57 percent were still fighting deportation, and 31
percent were detained for one year or longer. ACLU IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT, ISSUE
BRIEF: PROLONGED IMMIGRATION DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING RE-
MOVAL 4 & n.18 (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/prolonged-detention
_issue brief.pdf.
Available data, including the data cited in Demore, likely drastically undercounts the
length of pre-hearing mandatory detention, especially in geographic areas with many
inimigrants. Some non-mandatory detainees are released quickly. Also, many Mexican
nationals subject to expedited removal are detained and removed quickly at the border. Id.
Thus, Schriro's 2009 report found that a noncitizen is detained on average 30 days,
with 38 percent released within a week. ScHunio, supra note 3, at 6. Less than 1 percent of all
admissions, about 2,100 aliens, are detained for a year or more, and one could infer that a
significant portion of those 2,100 are mandatory detainees. A separate 2009 analysis of ICE
data that considered pre-removal order detainees (both non-mandatory and mandatory)
confirmed their detention was longer. See KERWIN & LI, supra note 13, at 1-2 MPI, Immiigra-
(ion Detention 1-2 (average length of detention for pre-removal order detainees was 81 days,
with average of 121 days for detainees with criminal convictions). Moreover, specific loca-
tions that handle high volumes of detainees report longer detention times. NYC KNow YOUR
RIGHTS PROJECT, CnY BAR JUSTICE CENTER, AN INNOVATIVE PRO BoNo RESPONSE TO THE
LACK OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 19 (2009), available at http://
www2.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/images/stories/pdfs/nyc-knowyourrightsnov09.pdf
(finding that 48 percent ofVarick Street detainees were held for four to six months, with
many up to twenty-eight months).
87. Innigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/courtbacklog/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
88. Id.
89. Demore, 538 U.S. at 567 ("[T]he length of the average detention period in great
part reflects the fact that the vast majority of cases involve aliens who raise no challenge to
removability at all.").
90. BENSON &WHEELER, supra note 4, at 11, 30.
91. Id. at 30 (enforcement initiatives will likely increase detention, negatively affect
representation rates, increase court inefficiency, and thus further increase backlogs);
NYIRS, supra note 6, at 372, 404 & n. 103 (ICE will prioritize deportation of immigrants
with prior criminal convictions).
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For mandatory detainees, their case processing time equals deten-
tion.92 No constitutional or statutory speedy trial guarantees ameliorate
this effect. Indeed, their immigration detention will often be longer than
time served for the original criminal disposition (if any).94 Moreover,
LPRs, with the most to lose from deportation since they have developed
family and work ties, are most likely to contest deportation-yet they face
a defacto incarcerative sentence if they do.95
As such, the prospect of prolonged mandatory detention coerces
some detainees to give up their rights and accept deportation to escape
detention. In some cases, detainees accept "stipulated removal"-akin to
a plea bargain-due to misleading information or coercion from ICE.97
Jennifer Lee Koh recently argued that this procedure violates due pro-
98
cess.
B. Procedures for Determining and Challenging Mandatory Detention
Having set out the lack of representation, I set out here the manda-
tory detention process that the detainee must navigate without counsel.
This section outlines the typical process for DHS' mandatory detention
determination, the Joseph hearing challenging it, and the eventual removal
hearing.99 All are legally complex. Moreover, as things stand, the im-
grant may be detained for months without any lawyer-government,
92. Juliet Stumpf has argued that immigration detention is a part of the "punish-
ment-by-process" that the criminal and immigration systems impose on an inmigrant. Cf
Juliet Stumpf, The Process is the Punishment in Crimnigration Law, in THE BORDERS OF PUN-
ISHMENT: CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION (Mary Bosworth & Katja
Aas, eds.) (forthcoming 2013).
93. Kalhan, supra note 1, at 49. Some other countries impose time limits on immi-
gration detention. See OPHELIA FIELD & ALICE EDwARDs, UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMIssIONER FOR REFUGEES, ALTERNATIVES To DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND
REFUGEES 187 (2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/
rwmain?docid=4472e8b84&page=search (Sweden imposes strict statutory time limits).
94. Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences, Toward a Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, 33 CARDozo L. REV. 585, 587-88, 590-95 (2011) (explaining that many
crimes that trigger mandatory detention and deportation may result in no jail time).
95. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,567-68 (2003) (SouterJ., concurring and dissent-
ing).
96. Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and
the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmy?abstractid=2039451.
97. JENNIFER LEE KOH ET AL., DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS iii, 2 (2011)
(stating that ICE provided detainees with "inaccurate, misleading, and confusing infor-
mation about the law and removal process").
98. Id.
99. See supra Figure 1, "Detention Pending Removal Proceedings."
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judge, or his own-even substantively reviewing the non-lawyer officer's
initial determination, let alone challenging it on his behalf.10
1.The Mandatory Detention Determination
The deportation process begins when ICE takes the immigrant into
custody, either after an ICE arrest or an ICE detainer after a local police
stop or completion of criminal incarceration. o0 An ICE officer, typically a
non-lawyer, may then issue a Notice to Appear ("NTA"), which formally
begins immigration removal proceedings.102 The officer may then issue a
Notice of Custody Determination (Form 1-286), which formally initiates
detention.0 3 For the mandatorily detained, the NTA's removal charge will
commonly be the Notice of Custody charge justifying mandatory deten-
*104tron.
When this non-lawyer ICE officer issues the Notice of Custody, he
conducts a threshold legal interpretation under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) of any
prior convictions to determine whether mandatory detention is warrant-
ed.'" The determination is made on a paper record. 10 Determinations are
increasingly time-pressurized as imnigration arrests increase, which may
lead to more incorrect determinations. o0 Indeed, DHS processes more
immigrants for detention in one year than any other detention system in
America, including the federal Bureau of Prisons or any state's prison sys-
tem.
100. See infra Section I.B.1.
101. See 8 C.F.R. § 287 (1966); Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Ex-
ecutive'sAuthority to Issue Inm(gration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 164 (2009).
102. The NTA can be issued by several DHS officials. 8 C.ER. § 239.1(a) (2005).
103. Form 1-286 issuance commonly occurs at or shortly after NTA issuance, by the
same DHS officer; however, nothing requires either. 8 C.ER. 5 236.1(g)(1) (2011).
104. See Kotliar, 24 1. & N. Dec. 124, 127 (B.I.A. 2007) (noting that if NTA lacks
basis for detention, imigrant must be given notice and opportunity to later challenge
mandatory detention).
105. Heeren, supra note 19, at 609-11 (explaining that bond may or may not be set at
officer's discretion).
106. Das, supra note 3, at 1684.
107. Id. at 1727 ("Frontline immigration officials make thousands of these assess-
ments every day .... "). Das argues that these "overburdened frontline officials" are less
likely to produce accurate results particularly because the immigration system has moved
beyond categorical analysis. See id. at 1735; see also infra Section I.C.1.
108. SCHRIRo, supra note 3, at 1446.
Although this Article discusses mandatory pre-removal hearing detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006), immigrants may also be mandatorily detained under other legal
authorities-e.g., post-removal order, or as arriving aliens at the border. For a general
overview of detention authorities, see Heeren, supra note 19, at 609-13.
Mandatory post-removal order detention occurs under 8 U.S.C. 5 1231(a) (2006).
Such a detainee is mandatorily detained for ninety days after the order of removal and, if
not removed during those ninety days, may be released under supervision. 8 U.S.C.
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Furthermore, DHS policy encourages officers to err on the side of
detention. DHS policy generally encourages over-detention rather than
under-detention, and requires detention guidelines be heeded strictly.09
DHS currently requires mandatory detention even for non-recent con-
victions, although several courts have rejected DHS' interpretation.o10
No attorney review of the mandatory detention determination is
required, and it is unclear whether it occurs in practice.I1 It does appear
in practice that an ICE field office attorney will review an NTA with
criminal charges, but will not review the custody determination."2 DHS
policy provides that detention questions "should" be directed to local
counsel, although actual practices are unclear."3
To the extent the NTA is reviewed, imnuigration judges have criti-
cized the "failure of ICE attorneys to evaluate and reject NTAs for legal
insufficiency."" 4 Judges and DHS cited "a willingness to 'let the court sort
it out,' " and "the possibility, however slight, that the person might later
comnit a brutal crime that the press and others would attribute to ICE's
$ 1231(a)(3). Certain inadmissible or criminal aliens, or immigrants whom DHS deter-
mines to be a flight risk or danger, may continue to be detained beyond the ninety-day
removal period. Id. § 1231(a)(6). Detention may not extend beyond a period "reasonably
necessary to secure removal." See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-701 (2001) (defin-
ing six months as presumptively reasonable); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386
(2005) (extending Zadvydas to inadmissible noncitizens). See generally Kalhan, supra note 1,
at 46 n.29.
Additionally, noncitizens arriving in the United States-which may include return-
ing LPRs and asylum seekers-are mandatorily detained if deemed inadmissible, without
any immigration judge review. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A) (2006). They
may be paroled into the United States. Id. § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing humanitarian parole).
Additionally, such immigrants arriving from either Mexico or Canada may be deported
pursuant to "expedited removal," a fast-track procedure that allows immigration officers to
issue removal orders with no hearing or review by an IJ. 8 U.S.C. %§ 1225(b)(2)(c), 1229a.
109. "An alien being considered for detention should be placed in the highest num-
bered priority within the top category possible." See Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson,
Undersec'y for Border and Transp. Sec., to Robert C. Bonner, Comm'r, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot. 1 (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
dro-policy~memos/detention.prioritization andnoticeto appear documentaryrequir
ements-oct2004.pdf [hereinafter Hutchinson Memo]. Mandatory detention represents the
highest category, ahead of"national security interest" aliens. Id. at 2.
110. See Louisaire v. Muller, 758 F Supp. 2d 229, 235-38 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (granting
habeas to an immigrant mandatorily detained two years after seventh-degree misdemeanor
drug possession charge with a three-day sentence). But see Gomez v. Napolitano, No. 11
Civ. 1350, 2011 US. Dist. LEXIS 58667, at *3 (S.D.N.Y May 31, 2011) (deferring to
agency interpretation of § 1226(c)). See generally NYIRS, supra note 6, at 373 n.35.
111. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 37, 38 n.127 (noting that in 2010, the ABA
recommended that DHS pilot lawyer approval of NTAs).
112. Telephone Interview by Dorothy DiPiscali with Stan Weber, Former Senior
Attorney, ICE/INS (an. 23, 2012).
113. Hutchinson Memo, supra note 109, at 2.
114. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 38.
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failure to remove the individual.""' Accordingly, over-charging and over-
detaining mistakes are "common.""6 One review found 117 cases over ten
years in which an "aggravated felony" determination was overturned."'
Another review of appealed Joseph decisions found forty-five immigration
judge rulings overturning mandatory detention over a four-year period."'
Other procedural deficiencies make it likely that a mandatory de-
tainee may not know he has a right to a Joseph hearing challenging his
detention. The Notice of Custody is provided to the detainee in Eng-
lish." 9 It affirmatively misadvises mandatory detainees, despite the
available Joseph hearing, that they "may not request a review of this de-
termination by an immigration judge because the Immigration and
Nationality Act prohibits your release from custody."20 No other DHS
notice of the right to ajoseph hearing is provided, nor required. Still, if the
mandatory detainee checks a box stating "I do request a redetermination
of this custody decision by an immigration judge," it appears in practice
that an immigration judge may provide aJoseph hearing.121
2.The joseph Hearing and Bond Determinations
At the Joseph hearing, a detainee may challenge the legal basis for his
mandatory detention before an immigration judge. It represents a detain-
ee's only chance to challenge the non-lawyer DHS' officer's decision.122
The Joseph hearing is an "informal proceeding." 23 There are no regula-
tions governing the Joseph hearing. Hearings are neither required 2 4 nor
115. Id.
116. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 19; Telephone Interview with Ken
Mayeaux, Professor of Prof'1 Practice, La. State Univ. Law Ctr. (Dec. 13, 2011) (notes of
interview on file with author).
117. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 20, 49-50 n.77, 50 n. 8 2 .
118. See Julie Dona, Making Sense of "Substantially Unlikely": An Empirical Analysis of
the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody Hearings, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcom-
ing) (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1856758.
119. See U.S. DEPT HOMELAND SECURITY, FORM 1-286, NOTICE OF CUSTODY DETER-
MINATION (Rev. Aug. 1, 2007)
120. Id.
121. Telephone Interview by Dorothy DiPiscali with Stan Weber, supra note 112.
122. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999); Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due
Process: The Need for Procedural Reform in 'Joseph" Hearings After Demote v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51, 75 (2006).
123. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 118; see also DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT
PRACTICE MANUAL 9.3(e), (e)(vi) (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
OCIJPracManual/Chap%209.pdf.
124. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 9.3(d).
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recorded.125 Hearings may be held in person, by videoconference, or by
telephone. 2 6 Decisions are usually rendered orally and not written unless
requested.127 The hearing may not even be translated. 128
In practice, Joseph hearings may follow procedures for bond rede-
termination hearings, although nothing requires this.12 9 Assuming bond
hearing regulations apply,Joseph hearings may occur where the immigrant
is detained. 30 The hearing must be provided within a "reasonable time,"
although many are not.131
Unlike other preventive detention schemes that place the burden on
the government,'3 2 in the Joseph hearing, the immigrant must meet the
difficult burden that the government is "substantially unlikely" to establish
the mandatory detention charge(s) at the removal hearing. " Thus, the
immigrant must prove that the government does not have a non-frivolous
argument that (1) the charged crimes warrant mandatory detention as, for
example, "aggravated felonies" or "crimes of moral tuipitude;" (2) the
immigrant has been "convicted" of the charged crimes; or (3) the immi-
125. Id. at 9.3(e)(iii); DETAINEE WORKING GROUP OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERs GUILD, BROKEN JUSTICE, A REPORT ON THE FAILURES
OF THE COURT SYSTEM FOR IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN NEW YORK CITY, 9 (Sept. 2006-
May 2007), available at http://nycicop.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/nlg-immigration-
court-report-06-07.pdf (discussions of bond were informal, often insufficiently or not at
all interpreted for the detainee, and "[t]he only thing entered on the record was the final
determination of bond by the judge, after being informed of the results of the attorney's
negotiations.").
126. DEPT OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 9.1(e). In 2010, video was used in about
one-third of bond redetermination hearings. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 21 &
n.59.
127. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 9.3(e)(vii).
128. IMMIGRATION COURT OBSERVATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS:A REPORT ON THE DUE PROCESS CRISIS IN NEWYORK CITY IMMI-
GRATION COURTS, 9, 11 (2011) [hereinafter ICOP, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS] available at
http://nycicop.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/icop-report-5-10-2011.pdf (observing bond
hearings not translated for detainees with limited English proficiency).
129. Practitioners generally assume that Joseph hearings are conducted under similar
rules as bond redetermination hearings. Telephone Interview by Dorothy DiPiscali with
Stan Weber, supra note 112;Telephone Interview with Ken Mayeaux, supra note 116.
130. 8 C.FR. § 1003.19(c) (2012).
131. Heeren, supra note 19, at 602 (client mandatorily detained for three years);
Sayed, supra note 17, at 1842 n.5 2 , 1852 n.105 (collecting cases).
132. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006) (civil commitment of sex offender upon
"clear and convincing" evidence).
133. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999); see also Bhargava, supra note 122,
at 74-75 n. 185; Sayed, supra note 17, at 1856; Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Infor-
mation Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform 16 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the University of Chicago Law School), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/




grant is an alien, not a citizen.134 Typically the Joseph detention issue, absent
other deportation grounds, will be later re-litigated as the ultimate depor-
135tation issue.
Thus, aJoseph hearing involves a decision based on "incomplete facts
and unresolved legal questions."1 36 The judge's determination may be
based on "any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or
that is presented to him or her by the alien or the [government]."m Ac-
cordingly, the immigrant may offer factual evidence or legal authority.3
"[W]itnesses may be placed under oath and testimony taken," but at the
judge's discretion.13 That said, there is a "traditional reluctance to permit
discovery" in immigration matters.o4 0 Moreover, ICE commonly requires
immigrants to file Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for gov-
ernment documents, since unlike a criminal case, Brady disclosures to
criminal defendants are not required.14 ' Thus, all this assumes the detainee
could independently produce witnesses and evidence while detained, or
142
contact a lawyer or family to do so. Conversely, the government may
meet its burden only with some "reason to believe" that mandatory de-
tention is warranted,'4 3 even based upon improperly certified or unofficial
evidence. '4 Further, immigration judges commonly grant DHS adjourn-
ments to produce evidence while the inmigrant remains detained.
134. See generally infra Section I.C.
135. Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, The Mandatory Detention Dilemma: The Role of the
Federal Courts in Tempering the Scope of INA 5 2 36(c), 10-07 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 5-6 &
nn.45-46 (2010).
136. Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript at 12).
137. 8 C.ER. 5 1003.19(d) (2012).
138. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003).
139. DEPT OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 9.3(e)(vi).
140. Das, supra note 3, at 1685, (quoting 1 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAw & PROCEDURE 5 3.07[3][b][ii][A] (2011)).
141. Compare BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 71 & n.195, (citing 8 C.ER.
%§ 103.8, 103.9, 103.10 (2011)), with Brady v. Maryland, 373 US. 83 (1963) (constitution-
ally requiring prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal defendant). The
Ninth Circuit has questioned the constitutionality of this practice. Dent v. Holder, 627
F3d 365, 374 (9th Cir. 2010) (unconstitutional to deny respondent access to his govern-
ment file "until it was too late to use it"). See generally Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing
Immigration Law on its Own Path, 33 CAnoozo L. REv. 431, 539-42 (2011).
142. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 34; NYIRS, supra note 6, at 387.
143. De la Cruz, 2008 WL 486898, at *1 (B.I.A.Jan. 28, 2008) (BIA "need not con-
clusively establish based on the undeveloped bond record whether both of the
respondent's convictions constitute crimes involving moral turpitude ..... ).
144. See JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that oral testimony is
sufficient); Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript at 15) (citing Jose Arturo Nuno-Sanchez,
2007 WL 4707447 (B.I.A. Nov. 28, 2007) (finding that an uncertified document from an
Internet site was sufficient "reason to believe")).
145. JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 23.
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If the immigrant loses the Joseph hearing, he generally remains de-
tained pending his deportation hearing.146 He may appeal to the BIA and
eventually with the appropriate court of appeals, although he remains de-
tained and his removal case moves forward.17 He also may file for habeas
. . .148in federal district court.
If the immigrant wins the Joseph hearing, he then may receive a
bond hearing, at which the irmnigration judge individually determines
flight risk or danger to the community.'" Bond may be set at $1,500 or
above.'90 If the immigrant makes bond, he may be released. However,
DHS may invoke an "automatic stay" provision by noticing its intent to
appeal bond; this keeps the immigrant detained and renders theJoseph and
bond hearings an "empty gesture" for several months.''
3. Removal Hearing
The cascading impact of detention also affects the detainee's ability
to litigate the eventual removal hearing. After the Joseph and/or bond
hearing, a "master calendar hearing" is held, which roughly compares to a
criminal arraignment.152 The immigrant is brought before an immigration
judge for an initial determination of the charges. He may contest the
charges or claim relief from removal.'5 3 Alternatively, the immigrant may
admit to the charged immigration violation and agree to "voluntarily de-
part" the United States with ICE's permission.'14 If the immigrant does
not voluntarily depart, he will ultimately receive an individual merits
hearing.
146. 8 C.ER. 5 1003.19(e) (2012) (showing insnigrants cannot ask for a redetermi-
nation unless a "material change of circumstances" occurs, even if they secure counsel).
147. 8 C.FR. § 1236.1(d)(3)(i), (d)(4) (2012).
148. Sayed, supra note 17, at 1843 n.52, 1852 n.105.
149. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 118 (citing Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638-39
(B.I.A. 1981)).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)( 2 006).
151. Ashley v. Ridge, 288 E Supp. 2d 662, 668 (D.N.J. 2003); 8 C.ER. 5 1003.19(i)(2)
(2012); Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court's Order: The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention
Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTs. L. REV. 89, 119-20 (2010) (noting that an automatic
stay enables detention during appeal for an extra 150-77 days). The BIA also possesses
general discretionary authority to stay the J's order, either on DHS's motion or its own. 8
C.ER. § 1003.19(i)(1).
152. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 14. See generally Kaufman, supra note 14, at
119.
153. See Marks, supra note 67, at 110-11.
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006); 8 C.ER. § 240.25 (2007).Voluntary departure, as op-
posed to departure under a removal order, is often more beneficial to the immigrant, as
certain bars on re-entry may not apply See BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 18.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).
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The merits hearing "generally conform[s] to the ... familiar adver-
sarial model," albeit without many criminal procedural protections.'5 6 An
immigration judge presides, and the immigrant must litigate against a
government attorney.'1 7 ICE must show deportability by "reasonable,
substantial and probative evidence."' 8 The immigrant can testify, present
witnesses, cross-examine government witnesses, and object to government
evidence." However, strict rules of evidence (such as hearsay) do not ap-
ply.160 The immigration judge will either find for the immigrant or enter a
removal order.'6 ' If a removal order is entered, DHS again mandatorily
detains the immigrant under different statutory authority, 62 albeit subject
163to some constitutional constraints.
C. Types of Legal Challenges to Mandatory Detention at the Joseph Hearing
As noted, a Joseph challenge to detention potentially involves three
grounds: (1) the charged crime does not statutorily warrant mandatory
detention, (2) the immigrant has not been "convicted" of the charged
crime, or (3) the immigrant is a citizen, not an alien. The complexity of
litigating these issues has increased as immigration courts incorporate
more searching factual inquiries requiring trial-type evidentiary hearings.
1. Beyond Categorical Analysis: Challenges to Immigration
Classifications of Criminal Convictions
The most common Joseph challenge is that the immigrant's prior
criminal conviction does not fall within an immigration category requir-
ing mandatory detention. 64 Federal immigration law primarily uses
categories of crimes to trigger detention and deportation, rather than
156. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 119 & n.34 (quoting THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF
ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 629 (4th ed. 1998)).
157. The INA requires the 1J to play a limited investigative role. Id.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006).
159. DEPT OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, 5 4.16.
160. Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182 (B.I.A. 1984).
161. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 120. Orders of removal are generally subject to ad-
ministrative and judicial review, although appellate review is restricted or barred for certain
grounds of deportability or denials of discretionary relief. Appeals are first to the BIA, then
to a federal court of appeals, and finally to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (2006).
162. See generally Kaufmnan, supra note 14, at 120.
163. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 US. 678 (2001). See generally Kaufman, supra note 14, at
120-21.
164. 77 percent of a sample of 167Joseph hearing appeals to the BIA involved a chal-
lenge to the inimigration classification of a conviction. See Dona, supra note 118
(manuscript at 2-4).
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cross-referencing specific state or local criminal statutes.1' Accordingly, an
LPR is mandatorily detained if convicted of (a) an "aggravated felony,"'6 6
(b) two "crimes involving moral turpitude" ("CIMTs") at any time after
admission into the United States,167 (c) one crime involving moral turpi-
tude with a term of imprisonment of more than one year,6 1 (d) a
controlled substance offense,'6 9 or (e) a firearm offense.'o Of these catego-
ries, the most common Joseph challenges are that a crime is not an
"aggravated felony" or a "crime involving moral turpitude."'7 ' Any of
these categories, if met, would also render the immigrant removable.172 As
Justice Alito argued, "determining whether a particular crime is an 'aggra-
vated felony' or a 'crime involving moral turpitude' is not an easy task." 73
This section summarizes, as succinctly as possible, the typical analysis in-
volved.
a. Aggravated Felonies
The term "aggravated felony" is an immigration law term of art and is
not connected to a state criminal statute's definition of a felony. Rather, an
aggravated felony is defined by reference to its twenty-one sub-
categories.174 Some of the sub-categories specifically reference other stat-
utes. Other sub-categories do not. Many crimes not ordinarily
categorized as aggravated felonies become aggravated felonies if a sentence
of one year or more is imposed. 77 Further complicating matters, the BIA
and courts commonly interpret the aggravated felony statute differently.1
165. Das, supra note 3, at 1672.
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2006).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 1226(c)(1)(C).
169. Id. § 1226(c)(1)(A).
170. Id. § 1226(c)(1).
171. Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript at 13). Of those 129 cases, 52 percent involved
challenges to a CIMT, 27 percent challenged an aggravated felony, and the rest were chal-
lenges to controlled substances or firearms convictions. Id.
172. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii) (2006).
173. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2006); see also Bhargava, supra note 122, at 58
(summarizing aggravated felony provisions).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006) (listing "a crime of violence (as defined in
section 16 of title 18.
176. See id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (defining "a theft offense" or "burglaiy offense" as one
in which "the term of imprisonment [sic] at least one year").
177. Id.
178. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488-89.
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Circuit splits are commnon,179 and even within circuits, the distinctions can
be "dizzying."'so
Moreover, the "aggravated felony" determination may encompass
minor criminal conduct. An aggravated felony may include attempted
possession of a controlled substance,'"' possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute,182 simple assault with a suspended sentence, 8 3 or petty theft
with a prior jail term.184 Because the "aggravated felony" provision is ret-
roactive, even convictions committed long ago may constitute aggravated
felonies even if they would not have resulted in deportation.
Traditionally, determination of an "aggravated felony" has been gov-
erned by categorical analysis, under which the immigration court analyzes
"the nature of the crime, as defined by statute and interpreted by the
courts and as limited and described by the record of conviction."
Although categorical analysis limits the factual inquiry to the record of
conviction, the statutory and legal analysis remains quite complicated, in-
volving a two-step analysis.18 First, courts employ a "strict categorical
approach," which is an examination of the statutory definition of the
criminal offense to determine if it is any broader than the relevant defini-
tion of an "aggravated felony."'8 If the definition is broader, the court
proceeds to a "modified categorical approach,"'" and consults the official
record of conviction to determine which part of the criminal statute
served as the basis for the immigrant's conviction.9 o The record of
179. The Supreme Court has resolved several recently. See Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007); Lopez v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 US. 1 (2004).
180. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1489 (Alito, J., concurring) (describing conflicting Ninth
Circuit opinions on whether simple drug possession constitutes an aggravated felony).
181. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)). See generally Maureen Sweeney, Fact or
Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 66
(2010).
182. Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2008).
183. United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 E3d 56, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (covering sin-
ple assault for punching a man in the face).
184. Mutascu v. Gonzales, 444 E3d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 2006).
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (2006).
186. Pichardo-Sufren, 21 1. & N. Dec. 330, 335 (B.I.A. 1996); see also Das, supra note
3, at 1674.
187. Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) ("[T]he categorical method is
not always easy to apply . . . ."); Das, supra note 3, at 1674-75.
188. Id. at 1674 n.18. Different circuits use different tests to ascertain the first step of
categorical analysis. See generally Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, Th7e Categorical Approach for
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 326-37 &
n.72 (2011).
189. Das, supra note 3, at 1674 n.18.
190. Nihawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2299 ("[A] court must determine whether an offender's
prior conviction was for the violent, rather than the nonviolent, break-ins" that a statute
proscribes.).
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conviction includes, at a minimum, the complaint, indictment or other
charging document, any plea agreement, any plea colloquy transcript, a
verdict or judgment of conviction,'9' and jury instructions or other rec-
ords. 92
Today, aggravated felony determinations may go beyond categorical
analysis to involve litigation of facts relating to the criminal conviction.
Courts now use a more factual, circumstance-specific approach. Courts
will look at whether the aggravated felony subcategory at issue refers "to
the particular circumstances in which an offender committed the crime
on a particular occasion."'93 If it does, pro se detainees must litigate a "po-
tentially endless" set of documents and evidence 1-e.g., admissions in
restitution orders and stipulations,'" pre-sentence reports,'96 police reports,
or witness statements. New testimony, witnesses, or trial transcripts may
be introduced regarding factual allegations untested or contradicted in
criminal court. 9" Indeed, most cases resolved by guilty plea lack a factual
record. Prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA's retroactive expansion of crimes
that trigger immigration consequences, and Padilla v. Kentucky, many
criminal lawyers never envisioned their client would be detained and de-
ported (if they considered imnuigration consequences at all).199 That all
said, the factual approach allows relitigation of the facts only one way,
since the immigrant cannot relitigate the conviction itself. 200
191. See Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137-38 (B.I.A. 1989).
192. See United States v. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010); Nijlhawan, 129 S. Ct.
at 2302-03.
193. Nihawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2300-01 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2006))
(explaining that under the "fraud and deceit" aggravated felony subcategory, which re-
quires a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, since loss was not an element of the
conviction, it was appropriate to determine loss by looking beyond the record of convic-
tion to the underlying facts and circumstances). Nijhawan listed other aggravated felony
subcategories that might require a similar approach. Id. at 2296 (citing 8 U.S.C.
%§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii), (K)(ii), (P), (N) (2006)).
194. Cf Das, supra note 3, at 1729.
195. Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303.
196. Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F3d 171, 178-79 (5th Cir. 2008).
197. Das, supra note 3, at 1706 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601
(1990)).
198. In most cases, the defendant would have been appointed a lawyer in criminal
court, albeit not always for minor crimes that may still constitute aggravated felonies.
Clapman, supra note 94, at 587-88, 590-95.
199. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02. This is different today after Padilla. See Marks, supra
note 67, at 105 (noting that "seasoned inuigration practitioners have become virtually
obsessive in developing records" in criminal cases); cf Jaclyn Kelley, An Irnrnigrant's Decision
to Plea or Not to Plea: Retroactive Availability of Padilla v. Kentucky to Noncitizen Defendants
on State Postconviction Review, 18 MicH. J. RACE & L. 213 (2012) (describing pre-Padilla
regime where counsel had no constitutional duty to advise on immigration
consequences).
200. Das, supra note 3, at 1726 n.274.
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All these issues are tremendously difficult for a pro se detained immi-
grant to litigate due to statutory complexity, the difficulty of accessing
criminal records, evidence, or witnesses (especially for crimes committed
long ago), and the informality of the Joseph hearing and lack of mecha-
nisms for discovery."'
b. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMTs)
The term "moral turpitude" is also an immigration law term of art,
and one that particularly evades precise definition.202 A "crime involving
moral turpitude" is generally defined as one that "shocks the public con-
science as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality."203 Generally, CIMTs involve some element of
204fraud, larceny, or intent to harm persons or property. The term may en-
205 206
compass minor conduct, such as turnstile jumping, shoplifting, or a
disorderly persons offense.207
As with aggravated felony analysis, CIMT determinations have ex-
,2081panded beyond categorical analysis. Immigration courts now possess
enormous discretion to consider "any additional evidence or factfinding"
beyond the CIMT record of conviction.209 The Attorney General imposed
this standard upon iminigration courts in his 2008 executive decision
Matter of Silva-Trevino.210 Many immigration judges now hold "Silva-
Trevino hearings" to hear additional facts bearing on inadmissibility or
removability, although it is unclear whether judges combine these with
201. Id. at 1728-29; see also supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. For recidivist
offenses, records of prior criminal convictions may be relevant as well. Fernandez v.
Mukasey, 544 E3d 862, 870 (7th Cir. 2008).
202. 8 U.S.C. 5 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489
(2010) (Ahto,J., concurring).
203. Solon, 24 1. & N. Dec. 239,240 (B.I.A. 2007).
204. Dadhania, supra note 188, at 319 & n.35.
205. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that under sec-
tion 440(d), turnstile jumping leading to a "theft of services" misdemeanor conviction is a
"crime of moral turpitude," subject to deportation).
206. Scarpulla, 15 1. & N. Dec. 139, 140-41 (B.I.A. 1974) ("Theft or larceny, whether
grand or petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude."); see Markowitz, supra
note 15, at 1302 n.11.
207. Castillo v.Att'y Gen., 411 EApp'x 500 (3d Cir. 2011).
208. Marks, supra note 67, at 105 (calling Silva- Trevino a "major sea-change" consti-
tuting "another giant leap" towards an approach unique to immigration law).
209. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690, 708 (A.G. 2008); see also Marks, supra
note 67, at 105 (courts now possess a "tremendous amount of discretion").The Attorney
General reasoned as such because "moral turpitude" is typically not an element of a crini-
nal offense. Id. at 699.
210. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687.
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Joseph hearings. 21' The Seventh Circuit and BIA follow this Silva-Trevino
expanded factual inquiry,212 while the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
have rejected it.2 13
2. Challenges to Immigration Impact of Non-Conviction
Criminal Dispositions
The immigrant may also challenge whether the particular disposi-
tion of his criminal case constitutes a "conviction" under federal
immigration law. 2 1 These types ofJoseph challenges are the second-most
common.215 "Conviction" is also a term of art in federal immigration
law, and like the other Joseph determinations, the required analysis is
complicated.2 16 Many criminal dispositions that are not convictions may
still render an immigrant mandatorily detained and deportable; 2 17 a v1o-
218.2220lation or offense,21 8 a dismissal, a deferred adjudication, a juvenile
22 1 222 . 223
adjudication, a revoked sentence, an expungement or nullification,
211. Marks, supra note 67, at 105.
212. Ali v. Mukasey, 521 E3d 737,741-42 (7th Cir. 2008); Guevara Alfaro, 25 1. & N.
Dec. 417, 420 (B.I.A. 2011).
213. Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F3d 472, 476 (4th Cir. 2012); Guardado-Garcia v.
Holder, 615 E3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010); Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F3d 462, 470 (3d
Cir. 2009).
214. See Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause
of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 677 (2008).
215. 11 percent of appeals to the BIA over a four-year period involved challenges to
whether a criminal disposition constituted a conviction. Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript
at 13, tbl.4); see also E-mail from Julie Dona, Judicial Clerk, The Honorable Judge Paul L.
Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Mar. 16, 2012) (on file
with the author); E-mail from Julie Dona, Judicial Clerk, The Honorable Judge Paul L.
Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Oct. 2, 2011) (attached
unpublished data) (on file with author). This 11 percent reflects 19 cases, some which
Dona classified as relating to "conviction status," and some which Dona classified as relat-
ing to "evidence-based challenges." Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript at 13, tbl.4).
216. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring).
217. Id. at 1490 n.2.
218. See Hussein v. Att'y Gen., 413 EApp'x 431, 432 (3d Cir. 2010) (disorderly per-
sons offense for possessing drug paraphernalia constituted "conviction").
219. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1490 n.2.
220. Id. Where a deferred adjudication statute requires a guilty plea, nolo contendere
plea, or an admission of sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and some form of
punishment, penalty, or restriction (such as a rehabilitative program) is imposed, such dis-
position is considered a conviction for immigration purposes. See Marks, supra note 67, at
106.
221. Uritzky v. Gonzalez, 399 E3d 728, 731 (6th Cir. 2005).
222. Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 E3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004).
223. See Marks, supra note 67, at 106; Salazar-Regino, 23 1. & N. Dec. 223, 234
(B.I.A. 2002) ("Congress did not intend to provide any exceptions from its statutory defi-
nition of a conviction for expungements pursuant to state rehabilitative proceedings.").
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or a pardon 224 may, depending on the circumstances, qualify as a "convic-
tion."225 Thus, challenging a conviction can be difficult for a detainee
because it requires a detainee to gather evidence potentially outside his
reach (most prominently, the record of conviction).
3. Establishing Citizenship
Third, in order to challenge his deportation, the imnigrant may
show at a Joseph hearing that he is a citizen. These are the least common
Joseph challenges, perhaps because detainees without counsel do not know
226they can raise citizenship claims.
Questions of citizenship, like every other issue at a Joseph hearing,
are "not always simple."227 This is particularly true for U.S. citizens who
have acquired or derived citizenship after birth. An individual born abroad
may "acquire" U.S. citizenship if at least one parent is a U.S. citizen and
other complicated criteria are satisfied.228 Alternatively, one may "derive"
224. The INA clearly lays out the categories of conviction that may not be cured by
pardon. 8 U.S.C. %§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(v), (2)(B)(i), (2)(C), (2)(D)(iii)-(iv), (3)(C)(i) (2006)
(showing that a pardon for a controlled substance offense, domestic violence offense, or
firearm offense may not cure the immigration impact of the conviction).
225. That said, vacatur of a conviction via habeas for ineffective assistance of counsel
negates the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. See Adamiak, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 878, 79 (B.I.A. 2006).
226. Marks, supra note 67, at 94; IACHR, supra note 4, 99 n.124. Dona found four
cases in a four-year period-2.4 percent of the appealed Joseph decisions-in which the
detainee claimed U.S. citizenship, and in each, counsel represented the detainee. Dona,
supra note 118 (manuscript at 9, 13 tbl.4). In 2007, theVera Institute identified 322 persons
in detention with potential U.S. citizenship claims. NINA SIULC ET AL.,VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM:
LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at
http://www.vera.org/download?file=1780/LOP%2BevaluationMay2008-final.pdf.
Since the current constitutionality of mandatory immigration detention rests on
plenary power principles affecting non-citizens, the adjudication of citizenship claims at a
Joseph hearing while detained appears constitutionally indefensible. Jacqueline Stevens, US.
Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting US. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 606, 637-38 (2011).
227. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 n.1 (2010). See generally Stevens, supra
note 226, at 637-38.
228. The individual born abroad is a U.S. citizen if both parents are US. citizens and
one parent "has had a residence in the United States" prior to the child's birth. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(c) (2006). If the individual is born abroad to parents, one of whom is a U.S. citizen
and the other a U.S. "national" but not "citizen," then the individual is a U.S. citizen at
birth if the U.S.-citizen parent resided in the United States "for a continuous period of
one year" prior to the child's birth. Id. § 1401(d). An individual born outside the United
States to a U.S. citizen and a noncitizen is a U.S. citizen at birth if the citizen parent was
"physically present" in the United States for "a period or periods totaling not less than five
years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years" prior to the
child's birth. Id. § 1401(g).
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citizenship if one is born abroad and a parent subsequently becomes a
naturalized citizen before the child turns eighteen and other complicated
criteria are met. 229 Thus, the factual evidence may include testimony or
affidavits of the detainee or his relatives, past immigration records, parallel
court orders, census reports, school records, or baptismal certificates.2 30 All
of this may be difficult to acquire while detained, and complicated to pre-
231
sent as evidence while pro se.
11. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION APPLIED TO IMMIGRATION
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEw DESPITE
PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
The application of procedural due process analysis to immigration
proceedings was not fully realized in the courts for several decades. How-
ever, after the 1970s procedural due process revolution, ushered in by
cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 232 immigration benefits were no longer con-
signed to the lesser "privilege" characterization of the rights/privileges
dichotomy. 23  Subsequently, courts have increasingly distinguished Con-
gress' plenary power over substantive immigration classifications from
courts' ability to review the procedural means attendant to those determi-
234
nations. Appointed counsel would be a classic change to the means
attending a detention and deportation classification, rather than to the
detention and deportation classification itself. 235
229. The child may derive citizenship if the naturalized citizen parent applies for
citizenship on behalf of the child, and (1) the child is under the age of 18, (2) either the
applicant or the applicant's U.S.-citizen parent was physically present in the United States
for period(s) totaling five years, at least two of which were after the age of 14, (3) the child
is residing outside of the United States in the applicant's legal and physical custody, and (4)
the child is temporarily present in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission, and is
maintaining such lawful status. 8 U.S.C. S 1433(a) (2006); Sungjee Lee, Derivative Citizen-
ship Thro ugh Parents, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 43, 45-46 (2007).
230. Stevens, supra note 226, at 659. For example, the BIA erroneously reversed a
Joseph decision that a detainee had derived citizenship from his citizen father because the
BIA interpreted state law to "require a court order or judgment of custody before the
father of a child born out of wedlock will be deemed to have legal custody of the child."
The parents could not produce such a court order, even though both testified at the Joseph
hearing. Monteiro Pina, 2007 WL 2197542, at *2 (B.I.A. 2007), rev'd, Pina v. Mukasey, 542
F.3d 5, 7-8, 12 (1st Cir. 2008).
231. One U.S. citizen detainee who lacked access to his birth certificate worked for a
dollar a day in the prison kitchen to earn thirty dollars to order a copy and be released.
JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 20.
232. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
233. Id.; Motomura, supra note 38, at 1650-56.
234. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
235. See Motomura, supra note 38, at 1628-29. That said, as set forth in Section
III.C.3, appointed counsel also impacts substantive fundamental values. See id. (calling the
right to appointed counsel a "procedural surrogate" with significant substantive content
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"Plenary power" doctrine dates to the Chinese Exclusion Case of
1889, in which the Court held that the federal government has plenary
power as incident to sovereignty to regulate admission and exclusion of
aliens, even though it is not explicitly granted by the Constitution.236 Sub-
sequent cases extended "plenary power" doctrine to deportation.237
Accordingly, the government can discriminate among different nationali-
ties or on protected First Amendment grounds in admitting, excluding, or
238deporting immigrants in a way it cannot in most other contexts.
However, courts have always recognized (if not always vigilantly en-
forced) a procedural due process "exception" to plenary power, so as to
review the procedures governing immigration determinations. 239 As Hen-
ry Hart put it, "a power to lay down general rules, even if it were plenary,
did not necessarily include a power to be arbitrary."24 0 After the 1970s due
process revolution, the ascendancy of the "liberty" interest was formally
recognized by the Mathews balancing test. Courts increasingly recognized
that lawful permanent residents possessed liberty interests, which deten-
tion impacted, as described below.
that "inevitably considers the due process enjoyed by others who are similarly situated");
see also Gideon v.Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
236. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603-
07 (1889); Motomura, supra note 38, at 1626 & n.2. This view is now largely discredited.
See Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1310-13. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining
Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365
(2002); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 862, 870 (1989); Gabriel Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apolo-
gy and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (1999); Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1389-96 (1953); Louis Hen-
kin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HAnv. L. REV 853, 863 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255; Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
925, 927 n.9 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 14-30 (1984).
237. FongYue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728, 731 (1893).
238. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1952) (Frankfurter,J., con-
curring).
239. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (summarizing cases); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601-03 (1953) (finding on sub-constitutional grounds that
regulation denying an exclusion hearing did not apply to a returning permanent resident
who had been serving on an American merchant vessel); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86
(1903) (noting that procedural due process applied to deportation proceedings); Motomu-
ra, supra note 38, at 1638-45 (sunmiarizing cases).
240. Hart, supra note 236, at 1390.
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A. Lawful Permanent Residents' (LPRs') Recognized Liberty Interests
Landon v. Plasencia, in 1982, established under Mathews that lawful
permanent residents possess a "weighty" liberty interest in deportation
proceedings. 241' The Court stated that "once an alien gains admission to
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent resi-
dence, his constitutional status changes accordingly."242 An LPR's liberty
interests include the right "to stay and live and work in this land of free-
dom,"243 and the "right to rejoin her immediate family," which "ranks high
among the interests of the individual." 244 justice Souter's Demore dissent
noted that the immigration laws encourage LPRs to establish these ties
permanently.245 Moreover, he found these ties even stronger for LPRs
brought as children, who have little reason to feel ties anywhere else.246
The Demore majority held that the failure to request a Joseph hear-
ing, as a concession of deportability, is a waiver of one's constitutional
rights as an LPR.247 However, any mandatory detainee requesting a joseph
hearing by definition has made no such concession and retains viable pro-
248
cedural due process arguments.
B. Immigration Detention's Impact on Liberty Interests
Generally, while the Court "has remained solicitous of the propriety
of detention itself," it has left the door open to procedural due process
challenges to immigration detention under Mathews.249 Detention has
generally been considered part of the "means" by which deportation is
applied, rather than part of the substantive deportation decision and thus
outside review.25
241. Landon, 459 U.S. 21. See also David Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional
Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 93-95
(arguing that LPRs should receive constitutional protection on par with citizens).
242. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
243. Id. at 34 (citing Bridges v.Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).
244. Id. (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503-504 (1977)
(plurality)).
245. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 544 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 514 n.3, 522-23 & n.6. Cf Klein & Wittes, supra note 20, at 151 (stating
that immigration detention is justified for "removal of those people from the country who
are not entitled to live in it").
248. See supra Section I.B.2.
249. Motomura, supra note 38, at 1655-56; Klein & Wittes, supra note 20, at 186
(arguing regarding immigration detention that "the greater possibility of error has trig-
gered the development of much more elaborate procedural protections.").
250. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,235 (1896) (permitting detention "to
give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens"); see Kanstroom, supra
note 8, at 1506-09.
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That said, later Cold-War era cases appeared to imply that the power
211
to deport equaled the power to detain. In Carlson v. Landon, the Court
upheld the Attorney General's order to detain four Communist Party
members without bail pending their deportation, holding that deporta-
tion was civil and "[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation
procedure."252 In ex rel Mezei, the Court upheld the exclusion and indefi-
nite detention without a hearing of a returning lawful permanent resident
on national security grounds.2 53
After mandatory detention provisions were enacted in the 1980s and
1990s, however, Zadvydas and Demore re-established the viability of pro-
cedural due process challenges to immigration detention procedures.2 54 In
Zadvydas, the Court avoided due process concerns by reading post-
removal order detention to no longer authorize detention when "removal
is no longer reasonably foreseeable."5 Conversely, in Demore, the Court
upheld pre-removal hearing mandatory detention on broad plenary pow-
256
er grounds, but emphasized the availability of individualized procedures
to challenge the detention classification.2 57
Lower courts following Demore have upheld various procedural due
process challenges to mandatory pre-hearing detention. Some have re-
viewed the difficult burden at a Joseph hearing, although no majority
panel has yet invalidated it on constitutional grounds. 58 Others have
Padilla may change the traditional view of immigration detention as incident to a
civil process, if deportation is "a unique legal animal that lives in the crease between the
civil and criminal labels." Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1299. However, such an argument
would likely affect Demore's substantive due process analysis that detention decisions are
subsumed by plenary power, rather than procedural due process arguments, which are
already cognizable. Such an argument may negate the Court's perceived need to find sub-
constitutional grounds for constitutional issues, even procedural due process claims.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601-
03 (1953); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YAIE L.J. 545 (1990).
251. See generally Benson, supra note 19, at 21-40; Klein & Wittes, supra note 20, at
145-52; David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
EMORY LJ. 1003, 1038 (2002).
252. 342 US. 524, 538 (1952).
253. Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); see also U.S. ex rel.
Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
254. Zadvydas, 533 US. 678; Demote v.Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n. 3 , 531 (2003).
255. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
256. Demore, 538 US at 521; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Deten-
tion Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. REv. 149, 163 n.73 (2004).
257. Demore also emphasized the limited time of detention, which subsequent empir-
ical data has called into question. Compare Denore, 538 U.S. at 529 (noting that in 85
percent of the cases in which aliens are mandatorily detained pre-hearing, removal pro-
ceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days), with supra Section I.A.2.
258. See, e.g.,Tijani v.Willis, 430 E3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima,J., concur-
ring); Bhargava, supra note 122, at 51.
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invalidated prolonged detention beyond the limited time Demore consid-
ered.25 9 The Ninth Circuit has affirmed class-action certification of a due
process challenge to mandatory detention provisions.260
III.THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL AT A JOSEPH HEARING
UNDER THE MATHEWS v ELDRIDGE PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS TEST
Once the case is made that procedural due process applies to man-
datory pre-hearing immigration detention, the next question is how it
applies. The Mathews v. Eldridge test balances three factors: (1) the individ-
ual's private interest at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the interest (as well as the probable value of additional or different proce-
dural safeguards); and (3) the govermnent's interest in using current, rather
than additional or different, procedures. 26' Here, I argue that under that
test, due process requires appointed counsel at the Joseph hearing to chal-
lenge detention for (at least) the limited sub-class of mandatorily detained
pre-hearing LPR immigrants.
Before considering due process analysis of the Joseph hearing, I
briefly summarize the current "case-by-case" approach to appointed
counsel in underlying removal proceedings. No court opinion has yet
considered how detention might impact that analysis.
The leading case on appointed counsel in removal proceedings is
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS. 262 There, the Sixth Circuit agreed that procedural
due process applied despite deportation's "civil" designation, and was par-
ticularly important to lawful permanent residents, for whom deportation
may equal "banishment." 263 It also found appointed counsel necessary if an
indigent "would require counsel to present his position adequately to an
imiigration judge."264 However, the court fashioned a case-by-case ap-
259. See, e.g., Diop v. ICE, 656 E3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding detention for
nearly three years without individualized hearing unreasonable). See generally Kimere Jane
Kimball, A Right to be Heard: Non-Citizens' Due Process Right to In-Person Hearings tojustify
Their Detentions Pursuant to Removal, 5 SmTN.J. C.R. & C.L. 159 (2009) (collecting cases on
prolonged detention).
260. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 E3d 1105, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009); Order and Prelim-
inary Injunction, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rodriguez.order.pdf
(entering preliminary injunction); see also Alh v. Decker, 650 E3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir.
2011) (reversing denial of class certification).
261. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
262. See Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 E2d 565, 568 (6th Cit. 1975); see also Michel-
son v. INS, 897 E2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990); Escobar Ruis v. INS, 787 E2d 1294, 1297
n.3 (9th Cir. 1986); Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689, 691 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Kan-
stroomu, supra note 8, at 1503-04; Kaufman, supra note 14, at 136-37.
263. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 E2d at 568.
264. Id. at 568 n.3.
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proach.265 No categorical right to counsel was found because Aguilera-
Enriquez did not contest the substantive grounds for his deportation-
namely, that his drug conviction rendered him deportable. Thus, the
Sixth Circuit found counsel would have made no difference in the
d-266proceedings.
Conversely, any mandatorily detained immigrant today bringing a
Joseph challenge to his detention will, in nearly every case, be challenging
his deportability on the same grounds. Counsel would make all the differ-
ence to his proceedings-both his detention and potential deportation.
However, no published opinion in the thousands of immigration pro-
ceedings since Aguilera-Enriquez has held a petitioner warrants counsel. As
Michael Kaufman argued, "it appears that a right to appointed counsel on
a case-by-case basis is effectively no right at all."267
A. Private Interest at Stake: The "Cascading
Constitutional Deprivation"
First, the pre-hearing mandatorily detained immigrant's private in-
terest at stake is the cascading constitutional deprivation of pre-hearing
detention: not just the deprivation of liberty, but its impact on the funda-
mental fairness of deportation proceedings, in which further deprivation
is at stake.
1. Immigration Detention as a Deprivation of Liberty
It is well-settled under Mathews that personal liberty, or freedom
from incarceration, lies "at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause,"268 and its "threatened loss through legal proceedings
265. See id. at 568.
266. Id. at 569.
267. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 137.That said, the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel in deportation proceedings has been traditionally assumed, even absent an explicit
finding of a right to appointed counsel in deportation proceedings. Currently, this remains
the policy in the immigration adjudication system and several, but not all, circuits. See
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (A.G. 2009); Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009)
(noting that aliens in removal proceedings have no right to counsel). Compare, e.g., Saleh v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 962 F2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel), with Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008)
(finding that there is no constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to effective assis-
tance of counsel in a removal proceeding). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Transporting
Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, Sr.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 43 (2011).
268. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2511 (2011); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 80 (1992); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
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demands 'due process protection: ,269 The liberty interest in avoiding
detention is the same for noncitizens and citizens.270 Moreover, "civil" in-
carceration is no different. Generally, courts applying procedural due
process analysis have looked beyond the civil or criminal label to whether
the facility constitutes an "institution of confinement." 271 If so, incarcera-
tion establishes a "rebuttable presumption" towards appointed counsel.272
273 274 cilJuvenile detention, psychiatric commitment, or civil contempt all
constitute severe deprivations of liberty under this analysis.275
Preventive detention regimes, increasingly reflect a similar presump-
tion towards heightened due process-and in some instances, appointed
counsel-at the hearing challenging detention.27 6 A "unifying theme" of
preventive detention schemes today-except immigration detention-is
that they require rigorous due process to ensure accuracy of individual de-
277
tention judgments and limit detention only to where necessary. In some
instances, such as a pretrial criminal bail hearing and a sexually violent
predator civil commitment hearing, the Court has cited the provision of
appointed counsel as a factor supporting the substantive constitutionality of
preventive detention. 278 This paradigm of preventive detention with due
269. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979)).
270. See Cole, supra note 17, at 719; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519, 524
(2004).
271. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 27 (1996) ("[H]owever euphemistic the title, a 'receiv-
ing home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which
the child is incarcerated .... "); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 ("[C]ommitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection
.... ) (citingJones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
272. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, at 41 n.8 (1981) (Blacknun,J., dis-
senting).
273. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (citing the "awesome prospect of incarceration").
274. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) ("[C]ommitnent to a mental hospital
produces'a massive curtailment of liberty.'") (citation omitted).
275. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) ("[A]n indigent defendant's loss
of personal liberty through imprisonment ... lies 'at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause.' ") (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
276. Preventive detention is employed not to punish a past act, but to forestall a fu-
ture danger or secure another governmental interest. Cole, supra note 17, at 699-705.
Mandatory pre-hearing detention falls within this category. Its purposes are twofold: to
secure presence at the removal hearing and prevent the comnission of further crimes.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518-20 (2003). Immigration detention-even for mandato-
ry detainees who have committed prior crimes--cannot by law be punishment. Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001); Peter Schuck, INS Detention and Removal:A White Paper,
11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 671 (1997).
277. Klein & Wittes, supra note 20, at 186-89, 191.
278. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,742, 746 (1987) ("When govermnent
action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process scru-
tiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner.") (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976)); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1997) (Kansas civil com-
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process has become increasingly normalized by statute; for example, when
Congress recently enacted an indefinite preventive-detention scheme for
alleged terrorist supporters, it provided appointed counsel to detainees at
their military detention hearing. 79
Thus, whether one views mandatory immigration detention as civil
detention, preventive detention, or (accurately) both, the prospect of in-
carceration for months or years strongly supports a right to appointed
counsel at the detention hearing. The detained immigrant suffers physical
confinement.280 The economic effect on detainees and their families from
loss of work is severe. human cost of separation is "self-evident,"282
and some detainees lose their children at custody hearings for failure to
283
appear.
That said, criminal pretrial detention is the one subset of preventive
detention in which courts have yet to find a constitutional right to coun-
sel at the detention hearing (i.e., bail hearing). Because pretrial
immigration detention most resembles pretrial criminal detention, in that
both pose a potential cascading constitutional deprivation, I address the
relationship here.284
First, I argue to harmonize the due process treatment of mandatory
immigration detention with the mid-twentieth century conceptualization
of the criminal right to appointed counsel under both the Fifth and Sixth
mitment of sex offenders follows hearing at which statutorily appointed counsel was pro-
vided, among other protections). Conversely, in Boumediene, the Court noted the absence
of counsel in Guantanamo proceedings, and the detainees' concomitant inability to find or
present evidence challenging detention, in holding the processes an inadequate substitute
for habeas. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781-85 (2008), (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335).
279. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, H.R. REP. No.
112-329, at 269-270 (2012) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-1 12hrpt329/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt329-ptl.pdf.
280. Often, this is in a jail alongside criminal detainees. SCHRIRO, supra note 3, at 2.
But the deprivation is the same even inside newer immigration facilities, akin to lower-
security prisons, that contain less restrictive conditions inside their fence. See Mark Noferi,
Making Civil Immigration Detention "Civil": Defining the Emerging Civil Detention Paradigm,
27 J. Civ. R. & ECON. D. (forthcoming 2013). The collateral effects of loss of work and
contact with family are the same. Id.
281. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("Pretrial confinement may imperil
the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.");
Legomsky, supra note 3, at 541-42; see also Jonathan Zweig, Note, Extraordinary Conditions
of Release Under the Bail Reform Act, 47 HARv.J. ON LEGis. 555 (2010) (discussing the hard-
ships bail imposes on pretrial defendants).
282. Legomsky, supra note 3, at 541.
283. See Seth Freed Wessler, Thousands of Kids Lost from Parents in US. Deportation
System, COLORLIN'Es (Nov. 2, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/11/
thousands-of kids lost in fosterhomes-afterparents deportation.html.
284. Cf Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovere(gn Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 390-92 (2006) (procedural similarities of criminal and immigra-
tion proceedings).
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Amendments, before Gideon was decided.285 Those academics and advo-
cates arguing for appointed counsel similarly emphasized the deprivation
of liberty at stake at a pretrial criminal bail hearing.
The statutory provision of appointed counsel at a bail hearing-in
the federal system, explicitly citing those academics and advocates-
codified their concerns into law, but it partially mooted their
development as a constitutional matter.287 As the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel developed and expanded to include any "critical stage," and as
the Fifth Amendment receded into the background of criminal appointed
counsel analysis, the question of whether either amendment requires
counsel at a bail hearing took on less practical importance.288 Moreover, as
Justice Thomas has pointed out, the Sixth Amendment protects trial
rights, and liberty interests alone "are protected by other constitutional
guarantees."289 (The impact of detention on trial rights will be considered
in the next section).
Still, even under its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court is
moving closer to a right to counsel at a bail hearing, or at least towards
recognizing that liberty restrictions factor in its appointed counsel analy-
285. See Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1470 ("Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel ju-
risprudence ... has never been fully independent from due process ideas ... Indeed ... the
modern Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel idea is best viewed as a subsidiary category of
broader norms.").
286. "Soon after arrest ... a lawyer should be available to explain the charge, to in-
vestigate the facts, to prevent unreasonable detention and unjustified bail .... N.Y. BAR Ass'N.
SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY DEFENDER, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AcCUSED 23 (1959) [herein-
after EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AccUSED] (emphasis added); see also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 58-89 (1963) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE AG] (examining criminal bail practices); id.
at 68-69 (listing among "punitive consequences" of pre-trial detention the deprivation of
liberty and poor conditions); id. at 76 (criticizing "initial bail decisions ... made in the
absence of counsel representing accused's interests").
287. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 advisory committee's note (1966 Amendment) (citing,
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, supra note 286.) A growing number of states and locali-
ties followed the federal government's lead. Ten states, plus the District of Columbia,
statutorily guarantee counsel at a criminal bail hearing. See Colbert, supra note 30, at 389
(noting that the following states statutorily guarantee counsel at a criminal bail hearing:
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota,
Vermont,Wisconsin). Several additional states also guarantee counsel in about three out of
every four localities where an indigent defendant first appears following arrest. Id. Only
ten states deny appointed counsel at a bail hearing statewide. Id. at 386.
288. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court held that counsel was not required at a
probable cause hearing, and suggested in dicta that courts might also determine bail then.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123-24 (1975) (probable cause determination "may be
incorporated into the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions of pretrial re-
lease.") (citation omitted). Gerstein thus "led many to assume that counsel is not required at
bail hearings either." Alissa Pollitz Worden, Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Elizabeth K.
Brown, A Patchwork of Policies: justice, Due Process, and Public Defense Across Anerican States,
74 ALB. L. REV. 1423, 1433 (2010).
289. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 235 (2008) (Thomas J., dissenting).
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sis. Its narrow holding, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County in 2008, was that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at a reasonable time following
a defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer at which he is in-
formed of the charge and "restrictions are imposed on his liberty."290
Rothgery did not rule on whether a bail hearing constitutes a "critical
291
stage" to Sixth Amendment trial rights, let alone whether and when
liberty itself triggers appointed counsel.Yet its characterization of pretrial
detention as "adversarial" is consonant with due process analysis that con-
siders both deprivation of liberty and the adversarial nature of
proceedings to support appointed counsel.292
The Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is not necessary to a
Fifth Amendment right to counsel here. Several cases have found such a
right based on deprivation of liberty alone.2 93 But Sixth Amendment ju-
risprudence supports a right to appointed counsel to pre-hearing
immigration detainees under the first Mathews factor.
2. Impact of Detention on Fundamental Fairness of
Underlying Removal Proceedings
Moreover, pre-hearing detention without counsel, in cascading fash-
ion, impacts the fundamental fairness of the underlying proceedings,
294
which in turn implicates the liberty interests affected by deportation.
Pre-Gideon academics and advocates similarly envisioned that a criminal
right to appointed counsel would recognize these trial impacts of deten-
tion. 295 As they argued, detention without counsel impedes the ability to
290. Id. at 194. Seegenerally id. at 205-10.
291. Id.; see also Colbert, supra note 30, at 341-42 (noting that Rothgery supports the
right to counsel at bail hearing); Colbert, supra note 21, at 17-20.
292. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, at 2520 (2011) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458,462-463 (1938)).
293. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 27 (1996).
294. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) ("Preserving the ... right to remain in
the United States may be more important to the [noncitizen criminal] client than any
potential jail sentence."). Notably, Padilla's focus on the severity of deportation adds little
to the liberty analysis, since deportation (at least of an LPR) was already considered a
"weighty" liberty interest. Compare Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010)
("Preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to
the client than any potential jail sentence.") (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323), vith Landon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). Furthermore, viewing deportation as something ap-
proaching punishment would not transform pre-deportation detention into punishment,
as criminal pretrial detention is already governed by due process. Bell v.Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979).
295. EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AcCUSED, supra note 286, at 23; REPORT OF THE AG, supra
note 286, at 58 (the "concern for pre-trial liberty" encompasses both "interests in individ-
ual justice and the viability of the adversary system"; it is "more than a concern that
persons not be punished before conviction," since a pretrial detainee "may also be de-
prived of opportunity to make adequate defense to the charges against him.") (internal
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undertake the "activities entailed in preparing for and conducting a de-
fense."2 96 The detainee "has no ability ... to obtain evidence," 297 whether
291
records or witnesses. Moreover, the detained defendant lacks the ability
299
to access a lawyer to plan strategy for the case. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized these concerns in the criminal realm, but presumed
any deprivation would be insubstantial since delay would be minimal-
not the case in immigration proceedings, where no speedy trial
guarantees apply.390 Rothgery impliedly affirmed those concerns by noting
that the defendant was "headed for trial and need[ed] to get a lawyer
working."30' Indeed, the Bail Reform Act codified these concerns in its
exception for temporary pretrial release to the extent "necessary for prep-
aration of the person's defense."'02
Thus, it is increasingly accepted that pretrial criminal detention-
even with appointed counsel-leads to more wrongful convictions.303
Empirical evidence supports this claim as well. Pretrial detention leads to
quotations omitted). Unlike deprivation of liberty alone, such impacts fall squarely within
Sixth Amendment protections of trial rights.
296. EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE AcCUSED, supra note 286, at 24; see also William M.
Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771, 780-81 (1961) (noting
that the delay in ability of defendant to access counsel implicates Due Process fundamental
fairness).
297. Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment; A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 62 (1962) [hereinafter
Kamisar, Right to Counsel] (citing Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 297 (1960));Yale Kamnisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The
Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REv. 219, 227 (1962) [hereinafter
Karnisar, Twenty Years Later]; see also Beaney, supra note 296, at 780.
298. REPORT OF THE AG, supra note 286, at 71 ("Confinement of the defendant" pre-
trial may "prevent adequate preparation for trial" and "not infrequently ... seriously inhib-
its the maintenance of an adequate defense"); id. ("[I]f witnesses are to be located,
interviewed, and brought to the attention of counsel, these functions must be performed,
if at all, by the accused, himself:"); id. (pre-trial detention also "impedes the lawyer's con-
tacts with his client," as detention facilities are often in remote locations, with facilities
"not conducive to effective consultation."); Kamisar, Right to Counsel, supra note 297, at 63.
299. EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, supra note 286, at 24, 35; see also Kanisar,
Twenty Years Later, supra note 297, at 227-28 ("[W]hen the average defendant is placed in
the witness chair ... he has been set adrift in an uncharted sea with nothing to guide him
... [how much more frightening, more perilous, is the predicament of the defendant ...
who is 'going it alone' all the way?") (emphases omitted).
300. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975) ("pretrial custody may affect to some
extent the defendant's ability to assist in preparation of his defense"); see also Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (noting that the stage from
defendant's arraignment to beginning of trial is "the most critical period of the proceed-
ings ... when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation" are essential for
guaranteeing fair trial).
301. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cry., 554 U.S. 191, 210 (2008).
302. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2006).
303. Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (2005).
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increased rates of conviction; for example, in New York City felony cases,
defendants detained continuously to disposition had an 84 percent chance
of conviction, compared to a 57 percent chance for those released.o
Groundbreaking studies by the Manhattan Bail Project in the 1960s
showed defendants detained pre-trial were more likely to be convicted in
every charge category.' Additionally, pretrial detention increases the se-
verity of conviction, as it is the "strongest predictor of incarceration."0 6
The cascading effect of pretrial detention is conceptually similar in
immigration removal proceedings, as the Dernore dissent recognized .3 07
Immigrant detainees face similar if not worse barriers to pretrial prepara-
tion. Most crucially, the ablity to collect evidence to rebut wrongful
detention and deportation is hampered.30' Indeed, immigrant detainees are
similar to the Rothgery detainee, who needed to procure criminal records
to rebut the existence of the predicate crime for his charged offense.
Moreover, because no counsel is appointed at any point, the impact
of pretrial detention on hearing rights is more evident and more severe.
Whereas criminal pretrial detention, even with counsel, results in a 27
percent increase in the chance of conviction, immigration pre-hearing
detention results in 97 percent of detained, unrepresented immigrants
310losing their cases. Moreover, an immigrant detainee faces a near-
permanent inability to secure counsel, which impacts his proceedings more
than a criminal pretrial detainee's relative inability to assist counsel that
will at some point be appointed.31 Transfers of immigrants to remote lo-
cations further exacerbate this inability.3 12 This "vicious circle" between
access to release and access to representation is exceptionally damaging."'
304. Mary T. Phillips, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 2: FELONY
CASES 58 (March 2008), available at http://www.cjareports.org/reports/
felonydecention.pdf; see also TIMOTHY C. HART & BRIAN A. REAVES, US. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1996 24 (1999).
305. Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin, & Herbert Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: A n
Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 NYU. L. REV. 67, 84-85 (1963); see also
Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.YU L. REV 641,641-655 (1964).
306. Marian R. Williams, The Efect of Pretrial Detention oni Imprisonment Decisions, 28
CRIM. JUST. REV. 299, 312 (2003) (noting that defendants detained prior to case disposition
were over six times more likely to be incarcerated).
307. "[D]etention prior to entry of a removal order may well impede the alien's abil-
ity to develop and present his case on the very issue of removability." Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 554 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting this "additional interest in avoiding
confinement").
308. Id. at 542.
309. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cry., 554 U.S. 191, 195-96 (2008) (noting that charges
were dropped once defendant obtained counsel who could procure records).
310. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 363-64.
311. Markowitz, supra note 57, at 556.
312. See supra Part I.A.3.
313. NYIRS, supra note 6, at 377.
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These barriers to representation exacerbate the aforementioned bar-
riers to pretrial preparation. Worse, pro se immigration detainees often
must file a Freedom of Information Act request for their government rec-
ords, since no Brady disclosures occur as in a criminal case.3 14 Even worse,
translation is severely inadequate.3 1 Finally, no exception exists for tempo-
rary pretrial release to help prepare a defense like that provided by the
criminal Bail Reform Act.
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation at the Joseph Hearing
Without appointed counsel, the risk is high of an erroneous depri-
vation of those cascading interests (or a "wrongful detention and
deportation"). Erroneous detention decisions do occur atJoseph hearings,
as shown by the substantial minority of immigrants who have won Joseph
claims (tellingly, all of whom somehow secured counsel).1  Erroneous
deportation decisions involving mandatorily detained, unrepresented im-
migrants also undoubtedly occur. As noted above, detained and
unrepresented immigrants are deported 97 percent of the time. Although
some, perhaps even many, of these cases involving the mandatorily de-
tained may be meritless, the discrepancy between that figure and the 74
percent success rate for non-detained, represented immigrants simply
cannot be explained by a "selection effect" alone.
Before analyzing the characteristics of removal proceedings that in-
crease the risk of wrongful detention and deportation, I briefly set out
here an overview of the seminal cases providing appointed counsel in the
criminal context. Today, in the context of due process, these arguments are
considered under Mathews' second factor. Then, the arguments were con-
sidered under a blend of Fifth Amendment "fundamental fairness" and the
Sixth Amendment.3 1 7
In its 1932 decision in Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held
that due process entitled indigent criminal defendants to "effective ap-
pointment" of counsel."" However, the Powell Court explicitly declined
to create a categorical rule for appointed criminal counsel. 319 The Court
held in 1938 that the Sixth Amendment required appointed counsel in
federal criminal cases, 3 0 and a few years later in Betts v. Brady, the Court
adopted a "case-by-case approach" to appointed counsel in state criminal
314. See supra note 141.
315. JAILED WITHoUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 34.
316. See Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript at 2-4).
317. See Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1470.
318. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
319. Id.
320. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
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cases.32 1 The Betts "case-by-case" rule survived until 1963, when the Court
in Gideon v. Wainwright found the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
be so fundamental that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated it
322
against states. (In immigration removal proceedings today, as noted,
there is only a Betts-like "case-by-case" approach to appointed counsel.)
Three major principles emerged from these criminal cases that con-
tinued into the Court's analysis of the risk of wrongful civil incarceration.
First, the Court emphasized the key role of counsel in providing analysis,
advocacy, and advice, particularly in complex proceedings. Second, the
Court noted that the adversarial nature of proceedings against govern-
ment counsel exacerbated those civil defendants' need for comparable
advocacy. Third, that need is exacerbated again where a vulnerable de-
fendant is particularly unable to effectively represent himself. I address
each in turn below, with a fourth subsection addressing particular proce-
dural deficiencies of a Joseph hearing which exacerbate the risk of
wrongful detention and deportation.
1. Complexity of Litigating Immigration Proceedings
The advocacy role of counsel, articulated by the Gideon-Powell line
of cases, is particularly crucial in minimizing risk of error in complex pro-
ceedings such as immigration proceedings. Gideon and Powell emphasized
the lawyer's key role in performing the skills commonly thought of as
lawyer's skills: conducting legal analysis,32 3 preparing a defense,324 conduct-
ing a factual investigation, and testing evidence.326
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly distinguished legally and factu-
ally complex proceedings, necessitating the skills identified by Gideon and
Powell, from inquiries where counsel would make little difference. For
example, the Court has distinguished complex legal analysis where "an
321. 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942) (noting that since due process was "more fluid"
than other constitutional provisions, the lack of categorically appointed counsel did not
offend notions of"fundamental fairness").
322. Gideon v.Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
323. "Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law ... [w]ithout [counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." Powell, 287 U.S. at
69.
324. "He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he may have a perfect one." Id.; see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
325. Powell, 287 U.S. at 63 n.1 ("It is manifest that there is as much necessity for
counsel to investigate matters of fact, as points of law, if truth is to be discovered.") (cita-
tion omitted).
326. "He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence,
or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible." Id. at 69; see also Gideon, 372
U.S. at 345.
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arguable defense would be uncovered only by a lawyer" from simple legal
32
analysis such as an undisputed conviction.327 The Court has given more
weight to legal analysis than to factual questions.328 And the Court has
distinguished factual issues necessitating significant factual investigation,329
evidentiary complexity,330 evidentiary testing in trial-type hearings, 3 or
the advocacy skills necessary to present disputed facts from simple,
"straightforward" factual questions such as indigence.3 32 As such, represen-
tation by a non-lawyer, e.g., a social worker, has sufficed only where
proceedings are not particularly complex or do not particularly necessitate
a lawyer's advocacy skills.333
The legal complexity of immigration law is well recognized33 4 and
ever-present at a Joseph hearing. Each of the three Joseph issues-the
immigration classification of a conviction, the inmmigration impact of a
non-conviction disposition, and citizenship-involves complex statutory
analysis. Indeed, for a pro se detainee to adequately argue that his convic-
tion is not an aggravated felony he must wade through complex BIA
327. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli 411 U.S. 778, 787, 789 (1972) ("In most cases, the pro-
bationer or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the
charges against him."); see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (not-
ing that the case "presented no specially troublesome points of law, either procedural or
substantive"). Gagnon provided for a case-by-case approach a la Betts v. Brady, as did Lassiter.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790-91.
328. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (noting "sufficiently straight-
forward" factual question of indigence); Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787 (distinguishing legal issue
of conviction from factual mitigating evidence counseling against probation revocation).
329. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787 (noting that mitigating evidence is often "so simple as
not to require either investigation or exposition by counsel.").
330. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 29, 32 (noting that a parental termination hearing is "not
likely to produce difficult points of evidentiary law"); Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87 (noting
the difficulty of "offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence").
331. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87 ("[T]he unskilled or uneducated probationer or
parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where
the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses .... ").This is so
"[d]espite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules of
procedure or evidence." Id.
332. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520 (distinguishing an "unusually complex case where a
defendant 'can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate' ") (quoting Gagnon 411
U.S. at 788).
333. Id. at 2519 (finding that a non-legal assistant might be constitutionally sufficient)
(citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 499-500 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring) (noting that
since psychiatric commitment is a medical issue, a licensed psychiatrist or other mental
health professional's assistance might suffice)). Turner found that "substitute procedural
safeguards" such as notice and opportunity to respond also might suffice. Id.
Notably, the Turner parties briefed and orally argued the impact of that case on the
constitutional rights of immigrant detainees, but the Court ultimately omitted the issue in
its written opinion. See generally Mark Noferi, Turner Could Support Appointed Counsel for
Immigrants, N.Y L.J.,July 22, 2011, at 6.
334. Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 E2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (comparing com-
plexity of immigration law to the Tax Code).
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provisions and circuit splits. He must research the nuances of the "cate-
gorical approach" and "modified categorical approach" to statutory
analysis, ascertain whether his criminal statute is "divisible," and determine
whether the applicable subcategory of the "aggravated felony" statute is
"generic" or "specific" and necessitates a fact-specific inquiry."'
This complex statutory analysis, "closer to a many-layered archeo-
logical dig,"33 6 is squarely within the lawyer's skills central to a fair trial.337
It raises, as Gideon did, the question of how an uncounseled immigrant
detainee could know whether he has a viable defense.3 38 To the extent the
Supreme Court has distinguished between complex and simple legal is-
sues-for example, the loose "best interests of the minor" standard of
family law 339-the Joseph issues here easily qualify as complex. Further, the
complex legal issues in Joseph hearings are far removed from the factual
questions that predominated in cases where the Court found appointed
counsel unnecessary, such as the facts of a parent-child relationship,34' a
medical evaluation of dangerousness, or the "straightforward" factual
342determination of indigency. Even if the Legal Orientation Program can
provide some knowledge on legal issues, the immigrant lacks the advoca-
cy skills to present the issues effectively.3 4 3
Moreover, this complex legal analysis is intertwined with the in-
creasing factual complexity of Joseph hearings. First, there is the factual
complexity inherent to analyzing a record of criminal conviction with
344
multiple components. Further, the increasing relitigation of facts of
conviction, necessitating the collection and presentation of evidence at a
trial-type Joseph or Silva- Trevino hearing, may add evidentiary complexity
335. See supra Section I.C.1.a.
336. Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2006).
337. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see also ABA Resolution on Civil Right
to Counsel, 15 TEmP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 507, 509 (2006).
338. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69-70. See generally Daniel Curry, Note, The March Toward
justice: Assessing the Impact of Turner v. Rogers on Civil Access- To-Justice Reforms, 25 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 487, 493-95 (2012) (arguing, citing this author, that Turner supports right to
counsel for immigrant detainees).
339. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 n.4, 29, 32 (1981).
340. Id. at 24, 29.
341. Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 499-500 (1980) (Powell,J. concurring).
342. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2511, 2519 (2011).
343. Mark Brown raised the question whether the provision of information short of
full legal representation might, under Mathews, mitigate the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion. Mark C. Brown, Comment, Establishing Rights Without Remedies? Achieving an Effective
Civil Gideon by Avoiding a Civil Strickland, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 893, 902-03 (2011) (citing
pro se clinics, "lawyer-of-the-day" programs, assistance hotlines, etc.) I argue here that full
representation is constitutionally necessary for mandatory detainees, for the reasons out-
lined above. See also infra Section III.B.3 (detailing particular vulnerabilities of detained
immigrants).
344. See Dona, supra note 118.
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necessitating trial advocacy skills.345 The skill of "testing evidence" has dis-
tinguished lawyer from layman since Powell.3 4 6 It is no less important
347
where informal rules of evidence apply, such as in immigration court.
Indeed, the procedural informality of the unregulated yet trial-like
Joseph hearing especially frustrates the detainee's ability to effectively pre-
sent his claims without counsel."' The hearing, if held at all, may only be
in English . If the detainee can collect evidence, presenting that evidence
by telephone or video may prove difficult."o The judge retains discretion
351to hear witnesses or not. It is difficult without discovery to test the va-
lidity of government evidence, even though it may include unofficial or
uncertified records.
One counter-argument is that counsel could be provided on a case-
by-case basis, since not every Joseph legal and factual issue will be
complex. Indeed, many mandatory detention challenges will be fruitless.
Still, the Court has never denied a categorical right to appointed counsel
where both incarceration and routine complexity exist. 54 Even the most
common Joseph determinations-those for aggravated felonies or crimes
involving moral turpitude-will routinely require complex statutory
analysis and case law research. It is rare that immigration law specifically
references a crime (for example, that "murder" constitutes an "aggravated
felony") .
2. Adversarial Proceedings Against Government Counsel
Further, the asymmetry of pro se detainees litigating these complex
proceedings against trained government counsel exacerbates the risk of an
erroneous decision. The Court has affirmed the special importance of a
lawyer's advocacy skills in adversarial proceedings against government
345. See infra Section I.C.1; cf Das, supra note 3, at 1732.
346. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (noting that a layman is "unfamil-
iar with the rules of evidence"); cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 29 (1981);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1972).
347. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (noting that hearsay may be
used, so long as "fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, at 11
n.7 (1996) (juvenile proceedings include hearsay, but providing for appointed counsel).
348. See generally supra Section I.B.2.
349. ICOP, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, supra at 128, at 9, 11.
350. See generally supra Section I.B.2.
351. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 9.3(e)(vi).
352. Dona, supra note 118 (manuscript at 15).
353. Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1354, 1359-60 (noting that in many simple non-
criminal deportations "there is little that an attorney would be able to do").
354. Cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 US. 18, 26, 31-32 (1981) (finding only
case-by-case right where incarceration was not at risk, and the complexity of the proceed-
ings "could be, but would not always be" great).
355. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2006).
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counsel.' Turner, for example, explicitly distinguished the potential
"asymmetry of representation" in private child support cases, where the
parent seeking support is also typically unrepresented, from government
efforts through "experienced and learned counsel" to deprive a defendant
of liberty.5 7
The adversarial nature of the Joseph hearing against DHS counsel,
trained in immigration law and advocacy skills, stacks the deck further
against the pro se detainee.3 " The American Bar Association (ABA) has
recognized the adversarial nature of removal proceedings."9 Even in civil
litigation, studies have unsurprisingly shown that an unrepresented party's
chances drop by approximately half when facing a lawyer.o
3. Detained Immigrants as aVulnerable Population
Third, uncounseled inmmigrant detainees are particularly vulnerable
to an erroneous decision. The Court has affirmed a lawyer's importance
to an especially vulnerable litigant, 6 such as a juvenile,362 mentally ill pa
363
tient, or even a parent with "little education" and "uncommon difficulty
in dealing with life" for which a hearing is "a distressing and disorienting
situation."364 Generally, the court has considered whether the respondent
is "capable of speaking effectively for himself."'3 6 Although categorically
vulnerable populations like juveniles and the mentally ill have received
356. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("That government hires law-
yers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessi-
ties, not luxuries."); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
357. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (citingJohnson, 304 U.S. at 462-
63).
358. Id. at 2520.
359. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 53, at 195 n.7 (removal proceedings are as "sim-
ilarly complex, adversarial, and consequential" as criminal proceedings) (citing AMERICAN
BAR AssOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5 (2006)); see also ABA Resolution
on Civil Riglit to Counsel, supra note 337, at 521 (the "emphasis of the right [to counsel] ...
is on the adversarial nature of the process, not what the tribunal is called.").
360. Debra Gardnerjustice Delayed Is, Once Againjustice Denied: The Overdue Riglit to
Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BAIT. L. REv. 59, 71-72 & nn.111-12 (2007); Russell Engler,
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Coun-
sel ls Most Needed, 37 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 37, 49 (2010).
361. "If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
362. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-42 (1996).
363. Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980).
364. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981).
365. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1972).
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special solicitude under Mathews," vulnerability has not been limited to
facial incapacity.367
Unfortunately, the extreme complexity of an immigration detention
hearing must often be navigated by a population least able to do so.368
Immigration detainees are most likely indigent foreign nationals, 36 9 and
language barriers can result in detainees unknowingly waiving rights.37 0
Courts have generally held that due process does not require an interpret-
er;37 ' however, this is extremely problematic since even with interpreters
misunderstandings are common.372 A counsel's guidance and preparation
may mitigate those effects.
4. Particular Procedural Deficiencies ofJoseph Hearings and Review
Moreover, the risk of wrongful detention at aJoseph hearing is com-
pounded by procedural deficiencies. The initial detention determination is
made by a non-lawyer on a paper record, without any requirement of
lawyer review, despite its legal and factual complexity. Courts have looked
unfavorably upon detention without court review, let alone detention by
a non-lawyer without executive branch lawyer review.
Review of the Joseph decision also suffers from procedural infirmity.
If the detainee seeks to appeal it, its informality makes appeal difficult, as
hearings are usually not recorded,7 ' and decisions are usually rendered
176
orally (unless the detainee knows to request otherwise). Moreover, BIA
366. See supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
367. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
368. Richard L. Abel, Practicing Imm(gration Law in Filene's Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1449, 1488 (2006); Jennifer Barnes, The Lawyer-Client Relationship in Immigration Law, 52
EMoRy L.J. 1215, 1217-18 (2003); Markowitz, supra note 57, at 551 (noting that 52 per-
cent of"the foreign-born population are limited English-proficient.").
369. Markowitz, supra note 57, at 548.
370. Davis, supra note 18, at 149-50.
371. Id. at 149 n.142; Tomas, 19 1. & N. Dec. 464, 465 (B.I.A. 1987).
372. Davis, supra note 18, at 149.
373. Werlin, supra note 23, at 420-21.
374. Indeed, one district court invalidated the Adam Walsh Act civil commitment
scheme on this ground. See United States v. Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d 985, 993-95
(E.D.N.C. 2011) (declaring Adam Walsh Act unconstitutional in part because initial de-
termination to detain is made by layperson). Additionally, the Boumnediene Court
distinguished between detention by executive order, and incarceration after a criminal
conviction, which "occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the
outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence." It im-
plied the latter is more consonant with procedural due process principles. Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781-83 (2008) (reviewing adequacy of substitute for habeas in accord-
ance with procedural due process principles) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)); see also Sayed, supra note 17, at 1867-68 & nn. 110-11, 1871-72.
375. DEPT OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 9.3(e) (iii).
376. Id. at 9.3(e)(vii).
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review is cursory, the court of appeals' review is deferential, and DHS can
detain the immigrant while it appeals the bond determination.3 Since
the deportation case proceeds apace, harm to litigating the underlying
deportation can be irredeemable.
Lastly, the high burden at a Joseph hearing ensures that mandatory
detainees with substantial arguments against mandatory detention will
lose Joseph hearings and remain detained.7  (Even where the detainee
wins, the government can automatically stay release of the detainee while
it appeals.)3 10
One could argue that these procedural deficiencies mean that coun-
sel would make little difference. After all, so the argument goes, if very
few mandatory detainees win Joseph hearings because Joseph hearings are
so hard to win, wouldn't the cost of counsel outweigh any benefit? That
said, the cascading constitutional deprivation here encompasses the ulti-
mate deportation hearing. As Justice Souter argued, the "heightened
standard of proof" at a deportation hearing "will not mean all that much
when the INS can detain, transfer, and isolate aliens away from their law-
yers, witnesses, and evidence.""" Moreover, it would pervert Mathews to
allow greater risk of wrongful determinations where the risk is already
high. It seems circular, if not pernicious, to adopt a rule that would en-
courage the government to deny some procedural safeguards with one
hand so as to strengthen its arguments to deny other procedural safeguards
with the other.
C. Government's Interests
The third factor to consider is the government's interest in using
current, less formal procedures, rather than providing appointed counsel,
so as to minimize costs and preserve administrative efficiency and flexibil-
ity. I argue here the government's interest is slight, especially where the
government seeks itself to expand the formality of immigration proceed-
ings, and provides appointed counsel in even more emergent contexts
such as wartime.382 1 argue as well, as others have, that Mathews analysis
377. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 141-44.
378. Jorjani, supra note 151, at 108.
379. Joseph, 22 1. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999); see also Bhargava, supra note 122,
at 74--75 n.186.
380. Jorjani, supra note 151, at 119-20.
381. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 554 (2003) (SouterJ., concurring and dissenting).
382. In Plasencia,Justice O'Connor applied the Mathews test to imnuigration laws by
stating that "it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration
is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the executive and the legislature."
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). One reading of Plasencia is that plenary power
principles presumptively tip the third Mathews factor towards the government, in immigra-
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should also reflect non-quantifiable but legitimate government interests in
fair and transparent proceedings for LPRs.
1. Purported Informality Despite Increasing Formality
Courts considering appointed counsel claims have balanced Gideon's
concerns against government interests such as "informality, flexibility, and
economy."'1 4  For example, a state's interests in the informality of
non-adversarial probation revocation hearings, designed to consider the
rehabilitative needs of a probationer, outweighed the other two Mathews
factors.385
Regarding mandatory inmigration detention, however, the gov-
ernment's move towards more formal, complex, and trial-like deportation
proceedings belies any purported interest in informality and efficiency. At
the Attorney General's direction, immigration judges in some circuits now
hold additional "Silva-Trevino hearings" to evaluate additional criminal
evidence, exacerbating an already backlogged process.86 It seems the gov-
ernment's goal is to detain and deport as many immigrants as possible, no
matter how long or how much evidence it takes.
Secondly, the government's interest in informal and efficient immi-
gration procedures carries far less weight inside the border than at the
border. At the border, the government seeks to efficiently and securely
prevent unlawful entry and remove unlawfully arriving aliens as quickly as
possible. Inside the border, however, deportation proceedings for post-
tion cases. Under that reading, though, there would appear little need for procedural due
process analysis.
Lower courts applying due process to immigration laws have infrequently interpret-
ed this language, and when doing so, have reached differing results. Compare Manwani v.
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 736 E Supp. 1367, 1376 n.18 (WD.N.C. 1990) ("Plasencia also holds
that proper constitutional analysis of procedural due process claims requires a traditional
balancing of competing interests, not absolute deference to congressional legislation."),
with Ferreras v.Ashcroft, 160 F Supp. 2d 617, 630 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (finding that petitioner's
deprivation of liberty at detention hearing is subject to "constraints imposed by Congress
pursuant to its constitutional authority over immigration matters").
383. The government's stated interests in pre-hearing mandatory detention-to se-
cure the immigrant's presence at trial and prevent future dangerousness-support the
substantive legitimacy of the detention, rather than the adequacy of the attendant proce-
dures to detention. Cole, supra note 17, at 709; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Re-
moval Proceedins, 43 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 345-50 (2008) (arguing that application
of constitutional criminal protections would not undermine the government's fundamen-
tal interest in expulsion cases). That said, alternatives to detention would likely further
those goals at much less cost. FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 82, at 3.
384. Gagnon v.Scarpelli,411 U.S. 778,788 (1972).
385. Id. at 787-88.
386. See Dadhania, supra note 188, at 354-55; Das, supra note 3, at 1674 n.18.
387. See Das, supra note 3, at 1738-41.
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entry unlawful action already involve an individualized trial-type hearing
presided over by a judge, against government counsel, with some due pro-
cess protections.'" These are the procedures for mandatory pre-hearing
detainees. Indeed, government counsels routinely seek continuances to
amend pleadings or obtain additional evidence 3 9-again, as above, evi-
dently to improve their chances of deporting more immigrants.
Third, if the government can now provide appointed counsel in
wartime detention proceedings, it can provide appointed counsel in
peacetime immigration proceedings. Al Qaeda supporters detained for
waging war against the United States now receive militarily-appointed
counsel in their preventive detention proceedings." Congress and the
Executive have provided this even though detention hearings may distract
from soldiers' wartime duties.
The exigencies of mandatory pre-hearing immigration detention
are not more pressing than those facing the military in wartime. Civilly
deporting long-time residents inside our borders is already more formal-
ized and protracted than detaining enemies outside our borders. (For
example, in Hamdi, the Court distinguished battlefield captures from deci-
sions to continue detention, with the latter warranting more due
process.)392 DHS has already created an adjudication system for detention
and removal, unlike some battlefield detention schemes." Although ple-
nary immigration power is derived from the executive's foreign policy
and warmaking powers,394 it cannot logically justify, on grounds of burden
on the government, less due process in peacetime than the government
currently provides in war.
388. Kanstroom, supra note 8, at 1464-65.
389. See JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 23; BENSON & WHEELER, supra note
4, at 84.
390. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, HR. REP. No.
112-329, at 269-70 (2012) (Conf. Rep.) (providing military appointed counsel in military
hearings to, inter alia, those who "substantially supported" Al Qaeda), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-1 12hrpt329/pdf/CRPT-1 12hrpt329-ptl.pdf.
391. Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 46 (1976) (finding that there is no due pro-
cess right to counsel in surnmary court-martial proceedings, in part because for military
personnel "time may be better spent than in possibly protracted disputes"); see JACK GOLD-
SMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 175 (2012) (describing increased due process in wartime
proceedings).
392. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
393. For example, DHS trial attorneys already collect and produce evidence. See id. at
534 (finding fact-finding imposition minimal where "documentation regarding battlefield
detainees already is kept in the ordinary course of military affairs").
394. See id.; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952) (noting that
power to deport derives from war powers). See generally Markowitz, supra note 383, at 305-
06 & accompanying notes.
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2.The Impact of Counsel on Costs, Efficiency, and Reduced Detention
A second government interest against providing appointed counsel is
the cost of counsel. However, appointed counsel at a Joseph hearing may
actually reduce the costs of immigration proceedings by increasing effi-
ciency and reducing detention.
Preliminarily, the cost of appointed counsel to mandatory pre-
hearing detainees is likely de minimis7 at least in comparison to the
overall costs of detention itself. For example, a comparable preventive
detention scheme-Minnesota's sex offender civil commitment pro-
gram-spent 2.3 percent of its detention costs on counsel and
administrative staff (both prosecutors and defenders).9  2.3 percent of
ICE's detention costs (1.77 billion dollars in fiscal year 2010) would be 40
million dollars (and that would even encompass non-mandatory detain-
ees).31 Moreover, since most long-term detainees are concentrated in a
few facilities, placing appointed counsel near targeted facilities would like-
ly result in a large "bang for the buck." 3
More fundamentally, any cost of appointed counsel would be coun-
termanded by reduced costs of detention and increased court efficiency.9
Detention is expensive and currently costs the government 122 dollars
per day per detainee (44,500 dollars per year).400 Because Joseph hearings
typically resolve the case, appointed counsel upfront at the Joseph hearing
might dramatically reduce detention costs and increase efficiency. 4 0
395. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
396. In 1998, Minnesota estimated its total cost of sex offender civil conunitment at
approximately $17 million per year, with $320,000 of that allocated to counsel. MINNEsOTA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CIVIL COMMITMENT STUDY GRouP, 1998 REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE 21 (1998), available at http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/documents/
Civil%20Conunitment%20Study%20Group%20Report%2to%20the%20Legislature.PDF
397. FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 82, at 3 & n.11. ICE, in the past, has spent .07
percent of its detention costs on providing detainees with legal rights information. IsOLAT-
ED IN DETENTION, supra note 63, at 5.
398. SCHRIRO, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that in 2009, 50 percent of detainees were
held in 21 of the 300 ICE facilities).
399. See Cole, supra note 17, at 720; cf Heeren, supra note 19, at 628 (arguing against
mandatory detention on cost grounds). A pilot program providing unbundled representa-
tion at criminal bail hearings caused the pretrial detention population to drop from 50
percent over capacity to 20 percent below capacity. Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys
Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDozo L.
REV. 1719, 1722-23 (2002).
400. About the US Detention and Deportation System, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdetention (last visited Aug. 10, 2011).
401. See Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1359 ("[I]f you are going to apply a right to
appointed counsel, it makes good sense to do so at the outset of the proceeding for people
with criminal removal charges."); Taylor, supra note 3, at 1697-98 (finding that brief con-
sultation convinced some detainees to accept immediate deportation) (citing GENERAL
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If a detainee wins the Joseph hearing, he will not only be released,
saving the government money, but he will likely be one less case in the
system.402 Conversely, if he loses the Joseph hearing, his deportation may
well be unavoidable. 403 In that circumstance, though, a lawyer might en-
courage him to accept deportation rather than litigating fruitless claims
from detention, again saving the government money and increasing effi-
404
clency.
3. Fairness and Transparency of Proceedings
The government's most significant interest may be ensuring fair and
accurate proceedings that protect the public legitimacy of its system of
detaining lawful permanent residents. 40s Although this interest is
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICIES AFFECT INS DETEN-
TION EFFORTS, GAOIGGD-92-85, at 46 (1992)).
Appointed counsel would also increase the efficiency of removal proceedings by
obviating the need for the court to advise pro se respondents. Markowitz, supra note 57, at
544-45.
402. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 58; Markowitz, supra note 57, at 565. He
would be more likely to be released, though, if DHS discontinued automatic stays of
release upon their appeal. SeeJorjani, supra note 151, at 120.
403. Unless he qualifies for discretionary relief (in some cases foreclosed by his con-
viction). See supra note 67.
404. BENSON & WHEELER, supra note 4, at 80-82. The ACUS report assessed the costs
to the government of lack of representation as including "respondents' remaining in tax-
supported detention based on unrealistic hopes." Id. at 58; see also Markowitz, supra note
57, at 545-46 (describing a drain on system by pro se respondents with no avenue for re-
bef). The ACUS report proposed increasing use of stipulated removal orders, pursuant to
which appointed counsel would provide important due process safeguards. BENSON &
WHEELER, supra at 80-82; KOH ET AL., supra note 97, at 18-19.
405. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to justice, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1785, 1799 (2001)
(stating that the right to counsel is "crucial to the legitimacy of the justice system," espe-
cially where "crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are imprecise and subjective,
proceedings are formal and adversarial, and resources between the parties are grossly im-
balanced"); Stumpf, supra note 284, at 378 ("Excluding and alienating a population with
strong ties to family, communities, and business interests in the United States fractures our
society in ways that extend well beyond the immediate deportation or state-imposed
criminal penalty."); see also Kaufman, supra note 14, at 145.
A counter-argument is available that noncitizens warrant less procedural rights on
expressive grounds. See Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 FLA. L. REv. 405
(1987) (noting that process has expressive value). Under this view, the lack of procedural
safeguards provided to noncitizens-particularly, appointed counsel, which has taken on
special meaning in American culture-expresses noncitizens' exclusion from membership
in society. Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) ("[Miranda] warnings
have become part of our national culture."); Stumpf, supra note 284, at 396-99. Here, I
argue that the counter-values of legitimacy and transparency, especially in detention pro-
ceedings, outweigh these expressive values of exclusion. This is particularly true regarding
LPRs, as the government has invited LPRs to this country and can expect they will build
ties to work and family, who possess an interest in legitimate and transparent proceedings
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unquantifiable, it should not be understated, since the Court has stated
that a "purpose of procedural due process is to convey to the individual a
feeling that the government has dealt with him fairly" 406 Our adversary
system presupposes that "accurate and just results are most likely to be
obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests."4 1 When deten-
tion is at stake, the necessity for public legitimacy increases since "the
power to detain human beings is one of the most awesome authorities
exercised by a sovereign." Accordingly, "due process and habeas corpus are
the sine qua non not only of all other rights, but of the very idea of limited
government."""'
The right to appointed counsel fits squarely within these maxims.
Under Gideon, "the right to counsel does not serve to protect guilty de-
fendants but to ensure equality and democracy for the rest of us."409
Indeed, in detention cases, the right to counsel is not simply "procedure
for procedure's sake" but a safeguard against potential "punishment-by-
,,4i0process.
Moreover, in the preventive detention context, procedural safeguards
such as appointed counsel help ensure that detention determinations do
not "fall back on stereotypes and prejudices as proxies for dangerous-
ness."1 1 This is a particular risk regarding immigrants, who are commonly
stereotyped as a "dangerous other."4 2
as well. Juliet Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L.
REv. 1705, 1719-21 (2011) (noting that the natural consequence of admission is for-
mation of community ties).
406. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,262 (1978).
407. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
408. Cole, supra note 17, at 706.
409. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (finding right to counsel en-
sures that "every defendant stands equal before the law");Victoria Nourse, Gideon's Muted
Trumpet, 58 MD. L. REV. 1417, 1427, 1431 (1999) ("Can a citizen, stowed away in jail,
believe that he is 'equal' before the law, when he cannot prove that the authorities are
wrong?"); see also Demote v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 554 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("An
opportunity to present one's meritorious grievances to a court supports the legitimacy and
public acceptance of a statutory regime.") (quoting Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301,
1305 (2003)).
410. Nourse, supra note 409, at 1418; Stumpf, supra note 92, (manuscript at 11).
411. Cole, supra note 17, at 696; Judth Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the
Federal Courts:An Essay in Honor of Henry Mohaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 579, 663 (2010);
Handi v. Rumisfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530-31 (2004) ("[Aln unchecked system of detention
carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not
present that sort of threat.").
412. See Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk,And Law: Reflections On The Demand For The
Preventive Detention Of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 731 (2011)
(citing DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CON-
TEMPORARY SOCIETY 184 (2001)); Resnik, supra note 411, at 663 (noting common
arguments used to justify detention with little oversight include "the characteristics of a
specific set of detainees-that they are alleged terrorists, postconviction prisoners, or mi-
grants entering without permission").
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IV PROVIDING THE RIGHT: PROPOSED CHANGES
AND EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES
Since the Mathews analysis in Part III indicates a need for appointed
counsel, Part IV sets out proposed changes in the regulations to provide
for appointed counsel before the Joseph hearing. I propose an Immigrant
Detention Defender Corps, and posit whether unbundledJoseph represen-
tation might suffice. Lastly, I evaluate alternatives short of full
representation-i.e., non-lawyer assistance or neutral notice or screening
processes-and argue that the legal, procedural, and factual complexity of
the joseph detention hearing requires a lawyer's advocacy skills.
A. Appointed Counsel for Mandatory Detainees at a Prompt
Joseph Hearing With Adequate Notice
I propose that upon DHS' determination to mandatorily detain, in-
digent detainees be appointed counsel at government expense with
reasonable time to prepare for their Joseph hearing. Notably, counsel
would not likely be constitutionally required at the detention determina-
tion, but rather within a reasonable time of the detention determination,
with enough time to prepare for the Joseph hearing."3
Concomitantly, DHS should promulgate regulations governing the
Joseph hearing process, which provide (1) adequate notice of the right to a
Joseph hearing-i.e., revision of the Form I-286,' (2) a Joseph hearing
within a specified reasonable time (e.g., thirty to sixty days), 41 5 and (3)
codification of the detainee's right to produce and test evidence. These
safeguards would rectify additional procedural deficiencies that affect the
detainee's liberty, counsel or not.
Further, DHS should promulgate regulations that make the joseph de-
tention hearing potentially dispositive, to encourage early resolution of
deportation proceedings. If the Joseph hearing had dispositive potential-
i.e., if a successful hearing for the immigrant could result in dismissal-both
the immigrant's counsel and government counsel would be incentivized to
produce witnesses and evidence and resolve the ultimate issues early. Today,
the low burdens give government counsel little incentive to produce evi-
dence, leading to continuances and further detention at government cost.
413. Cf Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (AlitoJ., concurring)
("[C]ounsel must be appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for ade-
quate representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as at trial itself.") (emphasis in
original).
414. See Markowitz, supra note 57, at 566.
415. See, e.g., N.Y MENTAL HYG. LAw § 10.06(g) (2008) (providing for probable cause
hearing as to sex offender commitment within 30 days, followed by jury trial); MINN. STAT
§ 253B.08 (2005) (requiring trial within 90 days of petition for commitment).
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B. Policy Impacts: Who Represents Detained Immigrants For How Long?
This section addresses the practical concerns of whom might repre-
sent detainees and for how long. Although this Article will not delve into
comprehensive doctrinal analysis of these policy proposals, I hope to
frame the debate for future scholarship.
1. "Unbundled" Representation at theJoseph Hearing:
Constitutionality, Ethics, and Practicality
"Unbundled," or "limited scope," representation by counsel only at
theJoseph hearing-and not in the underlying deportation proceedings-
would generally constitutionally satisfy the due process arguments made
here. That said, I argue that counsel could exit after the Joseph hearing
only if DHS changed current procedures to eliminate the continued de-
tention of those with substantial claims challenging detention.
Unbundled legal representation includes, most pertinent here, repre-
sentation by the lawyer of a client for only a portion of her case, without
rendering full service. In 2002, the American Bar Association updated
its Model Rule 1.2(c) to allow unbundled representation "if the limitation
is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed con-
sent."41' Forty-one states have adopted the new Model Rule or similar
provisions.1  Unbundled representation is currently employed in various
contexts to assist low-income clients such as family law,41 9 housing law,420
or bankruptcy.421 The ABA endorsed unbundled representation in bank-
1 422ruptcy for its positive "ripple effect" on later legal action by the parties.
416. See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE AssIsTANCE: A
REPORT OF THE MODEST MEANSTASK FORCE, 30-34 (2003).
417. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.2(c) (2002).
418. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, UNBUNDLING FACT SHEET (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/iigrated/legalservices/deivery/downloa
ds/20110331_unbundlingfactsheet.authcheckdam.pdf.
419. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 416, at 34-35; see also Richard Zorza, Discrete
Task Representation, Ethics, and the Big Picture: Toward A NewJurisprudence, 40 FAM. CT. REV.
19 (2002).
420. Brenda Star Adams, "Unbundled Legal Services": A Solution to the Problems Caused
by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts Civil Courts, 40 NEw ENG. L. REv. 303, 316-18 (2005).
421. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 416, at 34-35; see also David S. Kennedy & Vanessa
A. Lantin, Maintaining the Professionalism and Competence of a Lawyer in Bankruptcy Litigation
When Compensation Becomes a Problem and Related Matters, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 (2004).
422. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 416, at 34-35. For example, if a lawyer represents a
client during a creditors' meeting, often relief is granted after that meeting and the client
can subsequently proceed pro se. Id. But see Kennedy & Lantin, supra note 421, at 12 (con-




Although statistics are incomplete,4 23 evidence exists that unbundled
representation results in higher success than no representation at all. For
example, in a Massachusetts landlord/tenant "lawyer for a day" program,
between 28 percent and 56 percent of those with limited representation
retained their residences as compared to 12.5 to 15.8 percent of unrepre-
sented litigants.4 24
The constitutionality of unbundled representation is novel, since
immigration proceedings are unique. Nothing in the Constitution appears
to prohibit unbundled representation. In the criminal field, perhaps the
closest procedural analog, the pre-Gideon academics and advocates appar-
ently assumed that representation would start at the bail hearing and
continue through trial.425 Unbundled Joseph representation might reduce
government costs under the third Mathews factor, but conversely reduce
the risk of erroneous deprivation at the Joseph hearing under the second
factor.42 6
Allowing limited Joseph representation would likely provide great
help to mandatory immigration detainees. It would increase the chances
of successful pretrial release, as demonstrated by a pilot for unbundled
427
representation at criminal bail hearings. It would have a significant "rip-
ple" effect on the underlying proceedings. Indeed, in most cases where
the detention and deportation grounds are the same, there would-or
should-be little left to litigate after theJoseph hearing.
Unbundled representation would also remove a barrier that discour-
ages many pro bono organizations from assisting detainees, as
organizations fear litigating proceedings after the bond hearing if the case
is transferred to a far-flung state.428 While immigration court local rules
currently prohibit unbundled representation, pilot programs for unbun-
dled representation have been initiated. 42 9 In New York, the Inimigration
Court waived its rules to provide limited representation at bond hearings
or master calendar hearings.430
423. Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit ofiustice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbun-
died Legal Services, 18 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 453, 474-75 (2011).
424. Adams, supra note 420, at 318.
425. See supra notes 399-400, 411-15. For example, when those academics and advo-
cates emphasized the early initial interview with counsel, it does not appear they
envisioned a later interview with separate "trial" counsel. Beaney, supra note 296, at 780-
81.
426. Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to Counsel in
Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733,738 (2006).
427. See Colbert et al., supra note 399, at 1720 ("[Tjwo and one half times as many
represented defendants were released on recognizance from pretrial custody as were un-
represented defendants.").The study did not track results at trial.
428. Markowitz, supra note 57, at 562; NYIRS, supra note 6, at 404.
429. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 2.3(d).
430. Immigration Court Observation Project, Unbundled Representation in New York
City Immigration Courts, IMMIGRATION COURT OBSERVATION PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2011),
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There are some caveats. Immigration proceedings are complicated
and intricate, and ethics rules would require meaningful consent of the
client to limited representation."'1 Moreover, since any right to "unbun-
dled" counsel creates claims for ineffective assistance, even unbundled
counsel must have sufficient time to investigate the facts. This is especially
important atJoseph hearings, where the client may not possess all the facts
or know which facts support his claims.
Given the current highJoseph burden and automatic stay procedures,
however, unbundled representation would leave detainees with valid
claims abandoned after the Joseph hearing. Immigrants would then be
forced to litigate deportation proceedings pro se and detained.432 Such a
situation implicates the same fundamental fairness at trial that appointed
counsel should constitutionally protect. That said, if the Joseph burden was
shifted, the automatic stay repealed, and the immigrant given a chance to
win at the Joseph hearing without further proceedings, Joseph counsel
might be constitutionally sufficient.
At bottom, if unbundled representation was constitutionally provid-
ed at aJoseph hearing, it would be practically and ethically difficult to take
it away so long as the deportation case continued with the immigrant
detained.
2.The Composition of the Immigrant Detention Defender Corps
This Article advocates for a national corps of capable detention-
challenge and ideally removal-defense litigators-what I call the Imnnigrant
Detention Defender Corps. Different funding mechanisms could be used
to fulfill the constitutional duty to provide counsel. 34 For example, federal
http://nycicop.wordpress.com/ 2 011/10/19/unbundled-representation-in-new-york-city-
immigration-courts/; see Markowitz, supra note 57, at 562.
431. Kennedy & Lantin, supra note 421, at 12-14.
432. One solution is that "Joseph counsel" could stay in the case through Joseph ap-
peals; yet, since the deportation proceeds apace, trial rights would still be implicated unless
"Joseph counsel" was also "deportation counsel." This all presumes that the detention and
deportation grounds are the same, and the Government would drop the case and not
lodge another mandatory detention or deportation ground.
433. As this Article went to print, the New York Immigrant Representation Study
Group (NYIRS), see supra note 6, released Part II of its report, which proposed the first
publicly-funded "Deportation Defense Project" to provide universal representation to
immigrants in removal proceedings, regardless of the merit of their claims. See STUDY GR.
ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, NEW YORK IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY, ACCESS-
ING JUSTICE II:A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEWYORK IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS (2012) [hereinafter NYIRS II], available at http://wvw.cardozolawreview.
com/content/denovo/NYIRSReportll.pdf The report proposed to begin with immi-
grant detainees, as detainees face the most barriers, for many of the reasons set forth in this
article. See id. at 15-17.
434. SeeWorden et al., supra note 288, at 1437.
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sex offender civil commitment provides appointed counsel pursuant to
the procedures for indigent federal crinminal defendants.m
Ultimately, state criminal defenders, now required under Padilla to
advise clients on the innigration consequences of criminal dispositions,
may be the most logical candidates for such a corps. They are currently
required to learn the same immigration impact of a criminal conviction
that could be litigated in a Joseph hearing. Moreover, the continuity of
counsel from criminal proceedings to immigration proceedings will be
key to success.4 37 Indeed, state criminal counsel now routinely address fac-
tual issues with an eye towards their immigration impact.36 As the factual
inquiry at a Joseph hearing expands to relitigate the facts of conviction,
state criminal counsel would be best positioned to litigate those same fac-
439
tual issues in immigration court.
Funding, of course, is the crucial problem.o Practically, such a plan
could be funded by a novel federal-state partnership to deputize state
criminal defenders as federal immigration counsel, at least for a Joseph
hearing. One model is current federal-state prosecutorial enforcement
cooperation, such as Secure Communities and INA § 287(g). Of course,
this would raise difficult bureaucratic and political issues (but, notably, not
legal issues) beyond the scope of this Article.
3. Non-Lawyer Representation (Accredited Representatives)
Another solution may be to provide non-lawyer representation. How-
ever, I do not believe that this would be sufficient to meet due process
requirements. Joseph hearings require analysis, advocacy, and advice-skills
squarely within the province of lawyers. DHS regulations currently provide
for "accredited representatives" and "reputable individuals" to represent
435. 18 U.S.C. 4247(d) (2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006)).
436. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488-90 (2010) (Alito,J., concurring).
437. See Mark Noferi, Rutgers Webcam Case Underscores Uneven Treatment of Immigrants,
209 N.J.LJ. 127-28 (2012) (noting that Dharun Ravi's criminal lawyers preemptively
convinced ICE not to initiate deportation proceedings).
438. See supra note 199.
439. See supra notes 226-34, 244-45.This would of course be in situations where the
immigration court hearing occurs in the state where criminal counsel is located, which
would necessitate restrictions on ICE transfer policies.
440. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Looking Backward: Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FoRD-
HAM L. REV. 1461 (2003) (describing unfunded mandate after Gideon). Nothing legally
prohibits a criminal lawyer (public or private) from continuing to represent a client in
immigration court. Along these lines, forward-thinking defender offices have begun to
embrace a "holistic" model that addresses the broader needs of individual clients beyond
the termination of a criminal case. Id. at 1497-1500, 1504-06. Some had begun to employ
in-house immigration experts, even before Padilla. Ronald F Wright, Padilla and the Deliv-
ery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1533-34 (2011). That said,
additional representational responsibilities of course require additional funding.
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immigrants, and the ABA has supported this approach.442 The rationale is
simple: a non-lawyer is "better than no lawyer at all." Yet as Isabel Medi-
na recently argued, non-lawyers' lack of adversarial expertise may be
"more likely to exacerbate the problem" in deportation proceedings "than
to solve it." 444
The Court noted that something less than full representation, such
as a "neutral social worker," might suffice to meet due process require-
ments even in civil contempt proceedings leading to incarceration in
Turner v. Rogers.4 5 The Turner Court cited Vitek v.jones, in which the fifth
concurring vote found that the assistance of a mental health professional
446
was sufficient to litigate a medical issue.
At aJoseph hearing, however, there is significant need for the type of
skills that a lawyer, and only a lawyer, can provide. Unlike Turner, which
involved the filling out of a financial form,4 Joseph hearing issues are le-
gally, procedurally, and factually complex. These issues are litigated against
government counsel with months or years of incarceration at stake.
Specifically, the ability to collect, present, and test evidence has always
been at the heart of the Gideon right to counsel.449 Moreover, as a policy
matter, the official sanctioning of non-lawyers to practice law opens up
the possibility for widespread abuse. Few safeguards exist to monitor non-
lawyers acting as counsel.450
C. Evaluating Alternative Procedural Safeguards
Lastly, it is doubtful that "alternative procedural safeguards" could
suffice for immigrant detainees. For example, the Turner Court held that
neutral procedures such as notice, opportunity to respond, and a hearing
441. 8 C.FR. 5 1292.1 (2011).
442. RESOUTION 118, AMERIcAN BAR AsSocIATIoN COMMisSION ON IMMIGRATION
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 6-7 (2011) (adopted report and resolution to im-
prove access to counsel in imnigration removal proceedings), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/201 1_am_11 8.authch
eckdam.pdf.
443. M. Isabel Medina, The Challenges of Facilitating Effective Legal Defense in Deporta-
tion Proceedings: Allowing Nonlawyer Practice of Law Through Accredited Representatives in
Removals, 53 S. TEx. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2000979.
444. Id. (manuscript at 2).
445. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011); see also Laura Abel, Turner v.
Rogers and the Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, DENVER L. REv. (forthcoming), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=2000960.
446. Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 499-500 (1980) (Powell,J. concurring).
447. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.
448. See supra Section I.A.2. Unlike Vitek, the issues are not medical.
449. Medina, supra note 443 (manuscript at 10-11).
450. Medina, supra note 443 (manuscript at 5).
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on the record might constitute due process for the "straightforward" fac-
tual determination of indigence.' That said, it is hard to say that notice
and a hearing on the record would even the scales at a complex adversari-
al hearing against government counsel. Perhaps the strongest argument
against the sufficiency of neutral procedures is that Immigration Court
judges are already duty-bound to provide extra notice and advice to pro se
respondents,4 52 and the disparity in outcomes between represented and
unrepresented litigants remains stark.
Additionally, some courts and academics have argued that as a matter
of due process, detainees with "substantial" arguments at a Joseph hearing
should not be subject to lengthy detention.5  One option would be a
neutral screening mechanism to appoint counsel to those with substantial
claims against the detention decision.4 54 Yet as Hamdi counseled, the right
to procedural due process "does not depend upon the merits of a claim-
ant's substantive assertions."4 55 Moreover, in complicated immigration
cases, as Michael Kaufman argued, "[I]t takes an attorney to identify the
sorts of complex constitutional or statutory claims that only an attorney
can 'adequately' present."456 Given the complexity, it is unlikely an attor-
ney could identify all valid claims in an initial screening interview, since
the detained imunigrant may not know the facts supporting them. Essen-
tially, such an approach would echo the Betts v. Brady case-by-case right to
appointed counsel, which has turned out, in both criminal and immigra-
tion law, to be "no right at all."
CONCLUSION
In sum, I argue that a "detention-and-deportation Gideon" should
replace the current case-by-case approach for mandatory pre-hearing
immigration detainees, as Gideon replaced Betts v. Brady. The mandatory
detention process as it stands now is a recipe for wrongful detention and
deportations. Widespread academic criticism predated Gideon, and I hope
451. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
452. 8 C.ER. § 1240.11 (2009); see also 2 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMI-
GRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK 542-43 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter
BENCHBOOKI.
453. See, e.g.,Tijani v.Willis, 430 F3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima,J., concur-
ring); Bradley B. Banias, A "Substantial Argument" Against Prolonged, Pre-Remvoval Mandatory
Detention, 11 RUTG. RACE & L. REv. 31 (2009).
454. Markowitz, supra note 15, at 1358-60 (noting that for non-criminal aliens, an
impartial screening to determine eligibility for relief may suffice). Imnigrationjudges have
expressed discomfort, however, at "screening cases and recruiting pro bono counsel." Mar-
kowitz, supra note 57, at 561.
455. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 259 (1978)).
456. Kaufman, supra note 14, at 137; see also NYIRS REPORT PART II, supra note 433
(noting that neutral screening procedures are insufficient)..
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that this Article will spur courts to an analogous result."' Moreover, a
constitutional right to counsel for the limited subclass of mandatory
pre-hearing detainees may as a practical matter lead to a broader right
-4581generally in immigration proceedings.
Practically, however, the impact of appointed counsel at a Joseph
hearing may be blunted until DHS fixes other procedural deficiencies. As
things stand, two other DHS practices-the high burden at a joseph hear-
ing and DHS' practice of automatically staying release upon their
appeal-keep inmmigrants detained who have valid claims against deten-
tion and deportation. Thus, even if appointed counsel were provided to
detainees, counsel might choose to strategically forego a Joseph hearing,
given the low chance of winning and time and expense to gather wit-
459
nesses who will have to appear at the deportation hearing in any event.
This Article focuses narrowly on the issue of appointed counsel. But
I agree with other scholars who argue these practices are unconstitutional,
as they reverse the usual presumption against detention. 460 And, as stated
earlier, from a constitutional standpoint, it would be circular, if not perni-
457. See Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons From Gideon v.
Wainwright, 15 TEMP. PoL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 527, 531 (2006).
458. Russell Engler, Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines: When
Does Access to justice Mean Full Representation By Counsel, and Wien Might Less Assistance
Suffice?, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 97 (2010) (identifying "likely starting points in an in-
cremental strategy" for expansion of right to counsel).
459. In practice,Joseph hearings appear rare today. It may be for these strategic rea-
sons, or that many pretrial immigration detainees do not request a joseph hearing because
without counsel they do not know it exists. Another plausible explanation is that coun-
seled immigrants choose instead to file a motion to terminate proceedings, thus
challenging deportability rather than mandatory detention. See BENCHBOOK, supra note
452, at 605 ("The alien may request termination on grounds such as: the [Order To Show
Cause] is defective, e.g., not signed; incongruity between charge and allegations; the INS
has not met its burden of proof . . . ."). Usually, as previously mentioned, the issue of de-
portability and mandatory detention is the same. See supra note 135.Additionally, a motion
to terminate does not have the same high burden as a Joseph motion. See supra note 133.
That said, termination is generally without prejudice to DHS to file the same charge or a
new charge at a later time. BENCHBOOK, supra note 452, at 606.
If a right to counsel at a Joseph hearing was found, it would make the most practical
sense for DHS to consolidate its termination and Joseph motion procedures ssentially, to
make that hearing dispositive, as I argue above. See supra Section IVA. In any case, all this
would still be difficult for a detained pro se iunigrant to navigate, even if he knew these
procedures exist.
460. Bhargava, supra note 122, at 67 (arguing that the burden should match other
preventive detention statutes requiring at least "clear and convincing evidence"); Sayed,
supra note 17, at 1856; see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (2006) (denial of bail must be sup-
ported by "clear and convincing" evidence); 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006) (finding that
person is sexually dangerous similarly requires "clear and convincing" evidence"); see also
Jorjani, supra note 151, at 120-22 (arguing automatic stay provisions are unconstitutional);
Complaint, Gayle v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-806(D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2012), available at
http:///www.aclu.org/files/assets/gayle-v._napolitano -_amended-complaint-_-final.pdf
(federal class-action challenging the Joseph burden).
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cious, to hold certain procedural deficiencies adequate because others are
not.
Looking forward, the question of widespread preventive immigra-
tion detention may be as much moral as constitutional . It may involve a
"national look in the mirror" to ask "is this what America does?"4 62 So
long as the U.S. detains pending deportees in large numbers, however, the
system can at least provide transparent proceedings and a fair chance to
those caught in it, and help ensure that lawful residents are not wrongfully
detained and deported.
461. Cole, supra note 17, at 696.
462. William Glaberson, President's Detention Plan Tests Legal Tradition, N.YTIMES, May
22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/us/politics/23detain.html?_r=0. In fu-
ture research, I plan to articulate the limits of procedural due process to justify preventive
detention.
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